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Abstract In this paper, we present two non-zero inner-product encryption (NIPE) schemes
that are adaptively secure under a standard assumption, the decisional linear (DLIN) assump-
tion, in the standard model. One of the proposed NIPE schemes features constant-size
ciphertexts and the other features constant-size secret-keys. Our NIPE schemes imply an
identity-based revocation (IBR) systemwith constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-
keys that is adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption. Any previous IBR scheme with
constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys was not adaptively secure in the stan-
dard model. This paper also presents two zero inner-product encryption (ZIPE) schemes each
of which has constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys and is adaptively secure
under the DLIN assumption in the standard model. They imply an identity-based broadcast
encryption system with constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys that is adap-
tively secure under the DLIN assumption. We also extend the proposed ZIPE schemes in two
directions, one is a fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys, and
the other a hierarchical ZIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts.
This is one of several papers published in Designs, Codes and Cryptography comprising the “Special Issue
on Cryptography, Codes, Designs and Finite Fields: In Memory of Scott A. Vanstone”.
An extended abstract of a preliminary version [26] of this paper was presented in CANS 2011, the 10th
International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security. This is the full version of the extended
abstract [26] and provides significant technical contributions over [26], e.g., fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE
scheme with constant-size secret-keys, a hierarchical ZIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts, and proofs
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Functional encryption (FE) is an advanced concept of encryption or a generalization of
public-key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE). In FE systems, a receiver
can decrypt a ciphertext using a secret-key corresponding to a parameter v if and only if v is
suitably related to another parameter x specified for the ciphertext, or R(v, x) = 1 for some
relation R (i.e., relation R holds for (v, x)). More generally, a secret key in FE is associated
with a function f and a ciphertext of plaintext x is decrypted to f (x) by the secret key [9,28].
The first flavor of functional encryption traces back to the work of Sahai and Waters
[29], whichwas subsequently extended in [2,3,6,10,13,14,17,18,20,25,32]. In their concept
called attribute-based encryption (ABE), for example, parameterv for a secret-key is an access
control policy, and parameter x for a ciphertext is a set of attributes. Decryption requires
attribute set x to satisfy policy v, i.e., relation RABE(v, x) = 1 iff x satisfies v. Identity-based
broadcast encryption (IBBE) [1,8,12,16,30] and revocation (IBR) [21] schemes can also
be thought of as functional encryption systems where a ciphertext is encrypted for a set of
identities S = {I D1, . . . , I Dn} in IBBE (resp. IBR) systems, and to decrypt it by a secret-key
associated with I D requires that I D ∈ S (resp. I D /∈ S), i.e., relation RIBBE(I D, S) = 1
(resp. RIBR(I D, S) = 1) iff I D ∈ S (resp. I D /∈ S).
Katz et al. [19] introduced a functional encryption scheme for zero inner products, zero
inner product encryption (ZIPE) where a ciphertext encrypted with vector x can be decrypted
by any key associated with vector v such that v · x = 0, i.e., relation RZIPE(v, x) = 1 iff
v · x = 0. Their scheme is selectively secure in the standard model and the ciphertext size
is linear in the dimension of vectors, n, although it achieves an additional security property,
attribute-hiding, in which x is hidden from the ciphertext. As shown in [19], ZIPE provides
functional encryption for a wide class of relations corresponding to equalities, polynomials
and CNF/DNF formulae.
Attrapadung and Libert [4] proposed a ZIPE scheme as well as a non-zero IPE (NIPE)
scheme, where NIPE relation RNIPE(v, x) = 1 iff v · x = 0. NIPE supports a wide class
of relations corresponding to the complement of those for ZIPE. In their ZIPE and NIPE
schemes, without retaining the attribute-hiding property, the ciphertext size reduces to a
constant in n (the dimension of vectors, v and x), as long as the description of the vector
is not considered a part of the ciphertext, which is a common assumption in the broadcast
encryption/revocation applications. Hereafter in this paper, “constant” will be used in this
sense. In addition, the number of pairing operations for decryption in [4] is constant. Their
ZIPE system is adaptively secure in the standardmodel, but theNIPE scheme is not adaptively
secure (co-selectively secure) in the standard model.
The ZIPE system [4] implies an adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption
(IBBE) scheme with constant-size ciphertexts in the standard model, while previous IBBE
schemeswith constant-size ciphertextswere either only selective-ID secure [1,8,12] or secure
in a non-standard model [16,30]. Among IBBE systems with short ciphertexts (includ-
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ing selective-ID secure ones), the IBBE scheme [4] is the only one relying on standard
assumptions, namely the DBDH and DLIN assumptions. The NIPE scheme [4] implies a co-
selectively secure (not adaptively secure) identity-based revocation (IBR) system [21] with
constant-size ciphertexts in the standard model. Lewko et al. [21] presented IBR systems
with constant-size public and secret keys that are not adaptively secure. Hence, the following
problems are still remained.
1. No NIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts is adaptively secure in the standard
model, and no IBR scheme with constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys is
adaptively secure in the standard model. No NIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys
has been presented.
2. NoZIPE (or no IBBE) schemewith constant-size ciphertexts is adaptively (or selectively)
secure under a single standard assumption in the standard model. No ZIPE scheme with
constant-size secret-keys has been presented.
1.2 Our result
We address the problems. Note that all of our results are obtained in the standard model.
1. This paper presents the first adaptively secureNIPE scheme that has constant-size cipher-
texts or constant-size secret-keys (Sects. 6 and 7). The security assumption is a standard
one, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption. This implies the first adaptively secure
IBR scheme with constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys.
2. This paper also presents the first ZIPE scheme that has constant-size ciphertexts or
constant-size secret-keys and is adaptively secure solely under a single standard assump-
tion, the DLIN assumption (Sects. 8 and 9). This implies the first IBBE scheme with
constant-size ciphertexts that is adaptively secure solely under a single standard assump-
tion.
3. We present two extensions of the proposed ZIPE schemes. One is a fully-attribute-hiding
ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys (Sect. 10). It is obtained by applying the
technique of the fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme in [27] to the proposed ZIPE scheme
with constant-size secret-keys in Sect. 9, while the ZIPE scheme in Sect. 9 is weakly-
attribute-hiding. The other extension is a hierarchical ZIPE scheme with constant-size
ciphertexts (Sect. 12). These schemes are adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption.
The number of pairing operations for decryption is constant in all the proposed schemes.
We summarize a comparison of our results with those of [4] in Table 1 in Sect. 11 (see the
items of ‘Security’, ‘Assump.’, ‘CT Size’ and ‘SK Size’ in Table 1, for the features discussed
in Sects. 1.1 and 1.2).
1.3 Related works
Adaptively secure and attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme under the DLIN assumption has been
presented [25], but the ciphertext-size is linear in n (not constant), while our ZIPE scheme
has constant-size ciphertexts and is adaptively secure but not attribute-hiding.
After the publication of the preliminary version [26] of this paper, Chen–Wee [11] con-
structed a constant-size ciphertext and adaptively secure spatial encryption scheme, which
includes ZIPE as a special case. Although both of our ZIPE scheme and Chen–Wee’s scheme
have constant-size ciphertexts, the concrete size of a ciphertext in their scheme is shorter
than ours.
123
728 T. Okamoto, K. Takashima
1.4 Key techniques
All of the proposed schemes in this paper are constructed on dual system encryption [22,31]
and dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [20,24,25]. See Sect. 1.5 for some notations in this
section. In DPVS, a pair of dual (or orthonormal) bases, B and B∗, are randomly generated
using a fully random linear transformation X
U← GL(N , Fq) (N : dimension of span〈B〉 and
span〈B∗〉) such that B and B∗ are transformed from canonical basis A by X and (X−1)T,
respectively (see Sect. 2 and [20,24,25]). In a typical application of DPVS to cryptography,
a portion of B (say Bˆ) is used as a public key and the corresponding portion of B∗ (say Bˆ∗)
is used as a secret key or trapdoor.
In this paper, we develop a novel technique on DPVS, where we employ a special
form of random linear transformation X ∈ GL(N , Fq), or X ∈ L(4, n, Fq) of Eq. (3)
in Sect. 6.2, in place of fully random linear transformation X
U← GL(N , Fq). This form
of X provides us a framework to achieve short ciphertexts or short secret-keys as well
as a small number of pairing operations in decryption. It, however, is a challenging task
to find such a special form of X like Eq. (3) that meet the several requirements for the
dual system encryption method to prove the adaptive security of ZIPE and NIPE schemes
under the DLIN assumption. Such requirements are given hereafter. To reduce the secu-
rity of our schemes, especially Problems 1 and 2 in this paper, to the DLIN assumption,
the form of X should be consistent with the distribution of the DLIN problem. The form
of X should be sparse enough to achieve short ciphertexts or secret-keys. We should also
have a special pairwise independence lemma, Lemma 6 in Sect. 6.4, that is due to the
special form of X , where linear random transformations U and Z are more restricted (or
specific) than those of previous results, e.g., [25], with fully random X . See Sect. 6.1 for
more details.
1.5 Notations
When A is a random variable or distribution, y
R← A denotes that y is randomly selected
from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, y
U← A denotes that y is uni-
formly selected from A. A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over Fq , e.g.,
x denotes (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F nq . For two vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) and v = (v1, . . . , vn),
x · v denotes the inner-product ∑ni=1 xivi . The vector 0 is used to denote the zero vec-
tor in F nq for any n. X
T denotes the transpose of matrix X . I denotes the  ×  identity
matrix. A boldface letter denotes an element of vector space V, e.g., x ∈ V. When bi ∈ V
(i = 1, . . . , ), span〈b1, . . . , b〉 ⊆ V (resp. span〈x1, . . . , x〉) denotes the subspace gener-
ated by b1, . . . , b (resp. x1, . . . , x). For bases B : =(b1, . . . , bN ) and B∗ : =(b∗1, . . . , b∗N ),
(x1, . . . , xN )B : =∑Ni=1 xi bi and (y1, . . . , yN )B∗ : =
∑N
i=1 yi b∗i . An n-dimensional vector
e j denotes the canonical basis vector (
j−1
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0, 1,
n− j
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0) ∈ F nq for j = 1, . . . , n. GL(n, Fq)
denotes the general linear group of degree n over Fq . For a linear subspace V ⊂ F nq ,
V⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement, i.e., V⊥ : ={ w ∈ F nq | w · v = 0 for all v ∈
V }.
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2 Dual pairing vector spaces by direct product of symmetric pairing
groups
In this paper, for simplicity of description, we will present the proposed schemes on the sym-
metric version of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [23,24] constructed using symmetric
bilinear pairing groups given in Definition 1. Owing to the abstraction of DPVS, the presen-
tation and the security proof of the proposed schemes are essentially the same as those on
the asymmetric version of DPVS, (q, V, V∗, GT , A, A∗, e), for which see Appendix “Proofs
of Lemmas 4–12 in Sect. 6” in the full version of [25]. The symmetric version is a specific
(self-dual) case of the asymmetric version, where V = V∗ and A = A∗.
Definition 1 (Symmetric bilinear pairing groups) (q, G, GT ,G, e) are a tuple of a prime
q , cyclic additive group G and multiplicative group GT of order q , G = 0 ∈ G, and
a polynomial-time computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e : G × G → GT i.e.,
e(sG, tG) = e(G,G)st and e(G,G) = 1.
Let Gbpg be an algorithm that takes input 1λ and outputs a description of bilinear pairing
groups (q, G, GT , G, e) with security parameter λ.
Definition 2 (Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)) (q, V, GT , A, e) by a direct product of




G × · · · × G over Fq , cyclic group GT of order q , canonical basis A : =(a1, . . . , aN )
of V, where ai : =(
i−1
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,G,
N−i
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), and pairing e : V × V → GT . The pairing
is defined by e(x, y) : =∏Ni=1 e(Gi , Hi ) ∈ GT where x : =(G1, . . . , GN ) ∈ V and
y : =(H1, . . . , HN ) ∈ V. This is nondegenerate bilinear i.e., e(sx, t y) = e(x, y)st and if
e(x, y) = 1 for all y ∈ V, then x = 0. For all i and j , e(ai , a j ) = e(G,G)δi, j where δi, j = 1
if i = j , and 0 otherwise, and e(G,G) = 1 ∈ GT .
DPVS also has linear transformations φi, j on V s.t.φi, j (a j ) = ai and φi, j (ak) = 0 if
k = j , which can be easily achieved by φi, j (x) : =(
i−1
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,G j ,
N−i
︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0) where x :
=(G1, . . . ,GN ). We call φi, j “canonical maps”.
DPVS generation algorithm Gdpvs takes input 1λ (λ ∈ N) and N ∈ N, and outputs a
description of paramV : =(q, V, GT , A, e) with security parameter λ and N -dimensional
V. It can be constructed by using Gbpg.
3 Definitions of zero and non-zero inner-product encryption (ZIPE/NIPE)
This section defines zero and non-zero inner-product encryption (ZIPE/NIPE) and their secu-
rity. The relations RZIPE of ZIPE and RNIPE of NIPE are defined over vectors x ∈ F nq \ {0}
and v ∈ F nq \ {0}, where RZIPE(v, x) : =1 iff x · v = 0, and RNIPE(v, x) : =1 iff x · v = 0,
respectively.
Definition 3 (Zero and non-zero inner-product encryption: ZIPE/NIPE) Let a relation R be
RZIPE or RNIPE. A zero (resp. non-zero) inner-product encryption scheme consists of four
algorithms with R : =RZIPE (resp. R : =RNIPE).
Setup This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input security parameter. It outputs
public parameters pk and master secret key sk.
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KeyGen This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input vector v, pk and sk. It outputs
a decryption key skv .
Enc This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input message m, a vector, x , and
public parameters pk. It outputs a ciphertext ctx .
Dec This takes as input ciphertext ctx that was encrypted under a vector x , decryption
key skv for vector v, and public parameters pk. It outputs either plaintext m or
the distinguished symbol ⊥.
A ZIPE (or NIPE) scheme should have the following correctness property: for all
(pk, sk)
R← Setup(1λ), all vectors v, all decryption keys skv R← KeyGen(pk, sk, v),
all messages m, all vectors x , all ciphertexts ctx R← Enc(pk,m, x), it holds that m =
Dec(pk, skv, ctx ) with overwhelming probability, if R(v, x) = 1.
We define three security notions in Definitions 4–6.
Definition 4 (Adaptively payload-hiding security) The model for proving the adaptively
payload-hiding security of ZIPE (or NIPE) under chosen plaintext attacks is given hereafter.
Setup The challenger runs the setup algorithm, (pk, sk)
R← Setup(1λ), and gives
public parameters pk to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of queries, v,
to the challenger or oracle KeyGen(pk, sk, ·) for private keys, skv , associated
with v.
Challenge The adversary submits twomessages,m(0) andm(1), and a vector, x , provided that
no v queried to the challenger in Phase 1 satisfies R(v, x) = 1. The challenger
flips a coin b
U← {0, 1}, and computes ct(b)x
R← Enc(pk,m(b), x). It gives ct(b)x
to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of queries, v,
to the challenger or oracle KeyGen(pk, sk, ·) for private keys, skv , associated
with v, provided that R(v, x) = 1.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of adversary A in the above game, AdvZIPE,PHA (λ) (or AdvNIPE,PHA (λ)), is
defined by Pr[b′ = b]−1/2 for any security parameter λ. A ZIPE (or NIPE) scheme is adap-
tively payload-hiding secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in the game.
Remark 1 We have two remarks on variants of the above security notion.
• In aweaker security notion, selectively payload-hiding, the adversary is required to declare
the challenge vector x at the beginning of the game (before Setup). Similarly, the weaker
(selective) security variants can be defined in place of the two (adaptive) security notions
in Definitions 5 and 6.
• The above security notion, which is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA), can be
easily extended to the security notion against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) by allowing
an adversary to give decryption queries in Phases 1 and 2. Since there is a standard
(efficient) methodology to transform a CPA-secure FE (including NIPE/ZIPE) scheme
to a CCA-secure FE scheme by using the Canetti–Halevi–Katz (CHK) transformation or
the Boneh–Katz (BK) transformation [7] as is given in [25], we only present CPA-secure
NIPE/ZIPE schemes in this paper.
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Definition 5 (Adaptively weakly-attribute-hiding security) The model for proving the adap-
tively weakly-attribute-hiding security of ZIPE under chosen plaintext attacks is obtained
from the above game by replacing Challenge and Phase 2 steps by the following:
Challenge The adversary submits two messages, (m(0),m(1)), and two vectors, (x (0), x (1)),
provided that no v queried to the challenger in Phase 1 satisfies R(v, x (0)) = 1 or
R(v, x (1)) = 1. The challenger flips a coin b U← {0, 1}, and computes ctx (b) R←
Enc(pk,m(b), x (b)). It gives ctx (b) to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of queries, v,
to the challenger or oracle KeyGen(pk, sk, ·) for private keys, skv , associated
with v, provided that R(v, x (0)) = 1 and R(v, x (1)) = 1.
The advantage of adversary A in the above game, AdvZIPE,wAHA (λ), is defined by Pr[b′ =
b]−1/2 for any security parameterλ. AZIPE scheme isadaptively weakly-attribute-hiding
secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the game.
Informally, in adaptively fully-attribute-hiding security game, adversary is allowed to issue
both types of key queries, R(v, x (b)) = 0 and R(v, x (b)) = 1, in a single security game. It
gives a strong security than Definition 5 and is given in the following Definition 6.
Definition 6 (Adaptively fully-attribute-hiding security) The model for proving the adap-
tively fully-attribute-hiding security of ZIPE under chosen plaintext attacks is obtained from
the above game by replacing Challenge and Phase 2 steps by the following:
Challenge The adversary submits challenge attribute vector (x (0), x (1)) and challenge plain-
texts (m(0),m(1)), subject to the following restrictions:
• v · x (0) = 0 and v · x (1) = 0 for all the key queried predicate vectors, v.
• Two challenge plaintexts are equal, i.e., m(0) = m(1), and any key query v satisfies
R(v, x (0)) = R(v, x (1)), i.e., one of the following conditions.
– v · x (0) = 0 and v · x (1) = 0,
– v · x (0) = 0 and v · x (1) = 0,
The challenger flips a coin b
U← {0, 1}, and computes ctx (b) R← Enc(pk,m(b), x (b)). It gives
ctx (b) to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of queries, v,
to the challenger or oracle KeyGen(pk, sk, ·) for private keys, skv , associated
with v, subject to the restriction given in the challenge step.
The advantage of adversary A in the above game is defined as AdvZIPE,AHA (λ) :=Pr[A wins ] − 1/2 for any security parameter λ. An IPE scheme is adaptively fully-
attribute-hiding (AH) (against chosen plaintext attacks) if all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries A have at most negligible advantage in the above game.
For each run of the game, the variable s is defined as s : =0 if m(0) = m(1) for challenge
plaintexts m(0) and m(1), and s : =1 otherwise.
4 Decisional linear (DLIN) assumption
Definition 7 The DLIN problem is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given (paramG,G, ξG, κG, δξG,
σκG, Yβ)
R← GDLINβ (1λ), where GDLINβ (1λ) : paramG : =(q, G, GT ,G, e)
R← Gbpg(1λ),
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κ, δ, ξ, σ
U← Fq , Y0 : =(δ+σ)G, Y1 U← G, return (paramG,G, ξG, κG, δξG, σκG, Yβ),
for β
U← {0, 1}. For a probabilistic machine E , we define the advantage of E for the DLIN


























∣ . The DLIN assumption is: For any probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary E , the advantage AdvDLINE (λ) is negligible in λ.
5 Special matrix subgroups
Lemmas 1–3 are key lemmas for the security proof for our (H)IPE schemes. For a positive
integer n, let




























u, u′l ∈ Fq for l = 1, . . . , n,
a blank element in the matrix

































u, u′l ∈ Fq for l = 1, . . . , n,
a blank element in the matrix





Lemma 1 H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq) and H˜(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq) are subgroups of GL(n, Fq).
Lemma 1 is directly verified from the definition of groups. unionsq
For positive integers w and n, let
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μ′i, j,2 μi, j
...
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for i, j =






Lemma 2 L(w, n, Fq) and L˜(w, n, Fq) are subgroups of GL(wn, Fq).
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χ0,0 χ0,1en · · · χ0,wen



















Xi, j ∈ H(n, Fq),
χi,0 : =(χi,0,l)l=1,...,n ∈ Fnq ,
χ0,0, χ0, j ∈ Fq





GL(wn + 1, Fq). (5)
Lemma 3 L+(w, n, Fq) is a subgroup of GL(wn + 1, Fq).
Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 are given in Appendix “Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 in Sect. 5”.
6 NIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts
6.1 Key ideas in constructing the proposed NIPE scheme
In this section, we will explain the key ideas of constructing and proving the security of the
proposed NIPE scheme.
First, we will show how short ciphertexts and efficient decryption can be achieved in our
scheme. Here, we will use a simplified (or toy) version of the proposed NIPE scheme, for
which the security is no more ensured in the standard model under the DLIN assumption.
A ciphertext in the simplified NIPE scheme consists of two vector elements, (c0, c1) ∈
G
5 × Gn , and c3 ∈ GT . A secret-key consists of two vector elements, (k∗0, k∗1) ∈
G
5 × Gn . Therefore, to achieve constant-size ciphertexts, we have to compress c1 ∈ Gn

















∈ H(n, Fq) of Eq. (1) in Sect. 6.2, where μ,μ′1, . . . , μ′n
U←
Fq and a blank in the matrix denotes 0 ∈ Fq . The system parameter or DPVS pub-






























. Let a ciphertext associated with
x : =(x1, . . . , xn) be c1 : =(ωx)B = ω(x1b1 + · · · + xnbn) = (x1ωμG, . . . , xn−1ωμG,
ω(
∑n
i=1 xiμ′i )G), where ω
U← Fq . Then, c1 can be compressed to only two group elements
(C1 : =ωμG, C2 : =ω(∑ni=1 xiμ′i )G) as well as x , since c1 can be obtained by (x1C1, . . . ,
xn−1C1,C2) (note that xiC1 = xiωμG for i = 1, . . . , n−1). That is, a ciphertext (excluding
x) can be just two group elements, or the size is constant in n.
Let B∗ : =(b∗i ) be the dual orthonormal basis of B : =(bi ), and B∗ be the master secret
key in the simplified NIPE scheme. We specify (c0, k∗0, c3) such that e(c0, k∗0) = gζT · gωδT
and c3 : =gζTm ∈ GT . We also set a secret-key for v as k∗1 : =(δv)B∗ = δ(v1b∗1 + · · · +
vnb∗n). From the dual orthonormality of B and B∗, it then holds that e(c1, k∗1) = gωδ(x ·v)T .
Hence, a decryptor can compute gωδT if and only if x · v = 0, i.e., can obtain plaintext m by
c3 ·e(c0, k∗0)−1 ·e(c1, k∗1)(x ·v)−1 . Since c1 is expressed as (x1C1, . . . , xn−1C1,C2) ∈ Gn and
k∗1 is parsed as a n-tuple (K1, . . . , Kn) ∈ Gn , the value of e(c1, k∗1) is
∏n−1
i=1 e(xiC1, Ki ) ·
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e(C2, Kn) = ∏n−1i=1 e(C1, xi Ki ) · e(C2, Kn) = e(C1,
∑n−1
i=1 xi Ki ) · e(C2, Kn). That is, n−1
scalar multiplications in G and two pairing operations are enough for computing e(c1, k∗1).
Therefore, only a small (constant) number of pairing operations are required for decryption.
We then explain how our full NIPE scheme is constructed on the above-mentioned sim-
plified NIPE scheme. The target of designing the full NIPE scheme is to achieve adaptive
security under the DLIN assumption. Here, we adopt a strategy similar to that of [25], in
which the dual system encryption methodology is employed in a modular or hierarchical
manner. That is, two top level assumptions, the security of Problems 1 and 2, are directly
used in the dual system encryption methodology and these assumptions are reduced to a
primitive assumption, the DLIN assumption.
To meet the requirements for applying to the dual system encryption methodology and
reducing to the DLIN assumption, the underlying vector space as well as the basis generator
matrix X is four times larger than that of the above-mentioned simplified scheme. For exam-




X1,1 · · · X1,4
...
...




L(4, n, Fq) of Eq. (3) in Sect. 6.2, where each Xi, j is of the form of X ∈ H(n, Fq) in the
simplified scheme. The vector space consists of four orthogonal subspaces, i.e., real encoding
part, hidden part, secret-key randomness part, and ciphertext randomness part. The simplified
NIPE scheme corresponds to the first real encoding part.
Akey fact in the security reduction is thatL(4, n, Fq) is a subgroupofGL(4n, Fq) (Lemma
2), which enables a random-self-reducibility argument for reducing the DLIN problem to
Problems 1 and 2 in this paper. The property that H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq) is a subgroup of
GL(n, Fq) is also crucial for a special form of pairwise independence lemma in this paper
(Lemma6),whereH(n, Fq) is specified inL(4, n, Fq) or X . Our Problem2,which is based on
this lemma, employs special form matrices U
U← H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq) and Z : =(U−1)T.
Informally, our pairwise independence lemma implies that, for all (x, v), a pair, (xU, vZ),
is uniformly distributed over (span〈x, en〉 \ span〈en〉)× (F nq \ span〈en〉⊥) with preserving
the inner-product value, x · v, i.e., (xU, vZ) reveal no information but x and x · v.
A difference of matrix X with the ZIPE scheme will be noted in Remark 10.
6.2 Dual orthonormal basis generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator GNIPE,CTob below, which is used as a
subroutine in the proposed NIPE scheme.
GNIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n) : paramG : =(q, G, GT ,G, e)
R← Gbpg(1λ), N0 : =5, N1 : =4n,
paramVt : =(q, Vt , GT , At , e) : =Gdpvs(1λ, Nt ,paramG) for t = 0, 1,
ψ
U← F×q , gT : =e(G,G)ψ , paramn : =({paramVt }t=0,1, gT ),
X0 : =(χ0,i, j )i, j=1,...,5 U← GL(N0, Fq), X1 U← L(4, n, Fq), hereafter,
{μi, j , μ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...4;l=1,...,n denotesnon-zeroentriesofX1 as in Eq. (3),
b0,i : =(χ0,i,1, . . . , χ0,i,5)A = ∑5j=1 χ0,i, j a j for i = 1, . . . , 5, B0 : =(b0,1, . . . , b0,5),
Bi, j : =μi, j G, B ′i, j,l : =μ′i, j,lG for i, j = 1, . . . , 4; l = 1, . . . , n,
for t = 0, 1, (ϑt,i, j )i, j=1,...,Nt : =ψ · (XTt )−1,
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b∗t,i : =(ϑt,i,1, . . . , ϑt,i,Nt )A =
∑Nt
j=1 ϑt,i, j a j for i=1, . . . , Nt , B∗t : =(b∗t,1, . . . , b∗t,Nt ),
return (paramn, B0, B
∗






































for i = 1, . . . , 4,





where a blank element in the matrix denotes 0 ∈ G. B1 is the dual orthonormal basis of B∗1,
i.e., e(b1,i , b∗1,i ) = gT and e(b1,i , b∗1, j ) = 1 for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ 4n.
6.3 Construction
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, x : =(x1, . . . , xn), has an
index l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with xl = 0, and that input vector, v : =(v1, . . . , vn), satisfies
vn = 0. The plaintext space is GT .
Setup(1λ, n) : (paramn, B0, B∗0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B∗1) R← GNIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, b0,5), B̂∗0 : =(b∗0,1, b∗0,3, b∗0,4), B̂∗1 : =(b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,n, b∗1,2n+1, . . . , b∗1,3n),
return pk : =(1λ,paramn, B̂0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n), sk : ={B̂∗t }t=0,1.













0n )B∗1 , return skv : =(v, k∗0, k∗1).
Enc(pk, m, x) : ω, η0, η1, ζ U← Fq , c0 : =(−ω, 0, ζ, 0, η0)B0 , c3 : =gζTm,
C1, j : =ωB1, j + η1B4, j , C2, j : =∑nl=1 xl(ωB ′1, j,l + η1B ′4, j,l) for j = 1, . . . , 4,
return ctx : =(x, c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3).
Dec(pk, skv : =(v, k∗0, k∗1), ctx : =(x, c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3)) :
Parse k∗1 as a 4n-tuple (K ∗1 , . . . , K ∗4n) ∈ G4n,
D∗j : =
∑n−1
l=1 ((x · v)−1xl) K ∗( j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 4,




e(C1, j , D∗j ) · e(C2, j , K ∗jn)
)
, return m′ : =c3/F.
Remark 3 A part of output of Setup(1λ, n), {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , can be iden-
tified with B̂1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n, b1,3n+1, . . . , b1,4n) through the form of Eq. (6), while
B1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,4n) is identified with {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4; l=1,...,n by Eq. (6). Decryp-
tion Dec can be alternatively described as:
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c1 : = ( x1C1,1, . . . , xn−1C1,1,C2,1, . . . , x1C1,4, . . . , xn−1C1,4,C2,4 ),












η1 x )B1 , F : =e(c0, k∗0) · e(c1, (x · v)−1k∗1),
return m′ : =c3/F.
[Correctness] Using the alternate decryption Dec′, F = e(c0, k∗0) · e(c1, (x · v)−1k∗1) =
g−ωδ+ζT g
ωδ(x ·v)/(x ·v)
T = gζT if x · v = 0.
6.4 Security
The proofs of Lemmas 4–12 are given in Appendix “Proofs of Lemmas 4–12 in Sect. 6”.
Theorem 1 The proposed NIPE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plain-
text attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any machine A, there exist probabilistic machines E1, E2-1 and E2-2 whose run-
ning times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter







E2-h-1(·) : =E2-1(h, ·), E2-h-2(·) : =E2-2(h, ·), ν is the maximum number of A’s key queries
and  : =(11ν + 6)/q.
6.4.1 Lemmas for the Proof of Theorem 1
We will show Lemmas 4–6 for the proof of Theorem 1.
Definition 8 (Problem 1) Problem 1 is to guess β, given
(paramn, B0, B̂
∗
0, eβ,0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B̂∗1, {Eβ, j , E ′β, j,l} j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n)
R←
GP1β (1λ, n), where
GP1β (1λ, n) : (paramn, B0, B∗0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B̂∗1) R← GNIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂
∗
0 : =(b∗0,1, b∗0,3, . . . , b∗0,5), B̂∗1 : =(b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,n, b∗t,2n+1, . . . , b∗t,4n),
ω, τ, η0, η1
U← Fq , U U← H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq), hereafter, u, u′n ∈ F×q ,
u′1, . . . , u′n−1 ∈ Fq denote non-zero entries of U, as in Eq. (1),
e0,0 : =(ω, 0, 0, 0, η0)B0 , e1,0 : =(ω, τ, 0, 0, η0)B0 ,
for j = 1, . . . , 4;
E0, j : =ωB1, j + η1B4, j , E ′0, j,l : =ωB ′1, j,l + η1B ′4, j,l for l = 1, . . . , n,
E1, j : =ωB1, j + τuB2, j + η1B4, j ,
E ′1, j,l : =ωB ′1, j,l + τuB ′2, j,l + τu′l B ′2, j,n + η1B ′4, j,l
for l = 1, . . . , n − 1, and E ′1, j,n : =ωB ′1, j,n + τu′n B ′2, j,n + η1B ′4, j,n,
return (paramn, B0, B̂
∗
0, eβ,0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B̂∗1,
{Eβ, j , E ′β, j,l} j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n),
123
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for β
U← {0, 1}. For a probabilistic machine B, we define the advantage of B as













R← GP10 (1λ, n)
]












Remark 4 A part of output of GP1β (1λ, n), {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , is identified with







0l−1, Eβ,1, 0n−l−1, E ′β,1,l , . . . , 0l−1, Eβ,4, 0n−l−1, E ′β,4,l
)
for l = 1, . . . , n − 1,
eβ,1,n : =
(
0n−1, E ′β,1,n, . . . , 0n−1, E ′β,4,n
)
,











ωel , 0n, 0n, η1el
)
B1
for l = 1, . . . , n,
e1,1,l : =
(
ωel , τ elU, 0n, η1el
)
B1
for l = 1, . . . , n.
Using these vector expressions, the output of GP1β (1λ, n) is expressed as (paramn, B0,
B̂
∗
0, eβ,0, B1, B̂
∗
1, {eβ,1,l}l=1,...,n).
Lemma 4 For any machine B, there exists a probabilistic machine E , whose running times
are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvP1B (λ) ≤
AdvDLINE (λ) + 5/q.





β,0, e0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,3,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B∗1, {h∗β,1,l , E j ,
E ′j,l} j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n)
R← GP2β (1λ, n), where
GP2β (1λ, n) : (paramn, B0, B̂∗0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B̂∗1) R← GNIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, . . . , b0,5), δ, ρ, ϕ0, ω, τ U← Fq , ϕl U← Fnq for l = 1, . . . , n,
U
U← H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq), Z : =(U−1)T,
hereafter, u, u′n ∈ F×q , u′1, . . . , u′n−1 ∈ Fq and z, z′n ∈ F×q , z′1, . . . , z′n−1 ∈ Fq
denote non-zero entries of U and ZT, as in Eq. (1), respectively,
h∗0,0 : =(δ, 0, 0, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , h∗1,0 : =(δ, ρ, 0, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , e0 : =(ω, τ, 0, 0, 0)B0 ,
















for l = 1, . . . , n,
h∗1,1,l : =
(





for l = 1, . . . , n,
for j = 1, . . . , 4; E j : =ωB1, j + τuB2, j ,
E ′j,l : =ωB ′1, j,l + τuB ′2, j,l + τu′l B ′2, j,n for l = 1, . . . , n − 1,
123
738 T. Okamoto, K. Takashima
E ′j,n : =ωB ′1, j,n + τu′n B ′2, j,n,




β,0, e0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,3,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B∗1,
{h∗β,1,l , E j , E ′j,l} j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n),
for β
U← {0, 1}. For a probabilistic adversaryB, the advantage ofB for Problem 2,AdvP2B (λ),
is similarly defined as in Definition 8.
Remark 5 A part of output of GP2β (1λ, n), {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,3,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , can be iden-
tified with B̂1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n, b1,2n+1, . . . , b1,4n) in the form of Eq. (6), while B1 :
=(b1,1, . . . , b1,4n) is identified with {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n by Eq. (6). If we make







0l−1, E1, 0n−l−1, E ′1,l , . . . , 0l−1, E4, 0n−l−1, E ′4,l
)
for l = 1, . . . , n − 1,
e1,n : =
(
0n−1, E ′1,n, . . . , 0n−1, E ′4,n
)
,











ωel , τ elU, 0n, 0n
)
B1
for l = 1, . . . , n.





β,0, e0, B̂1, B
∗
1, {h∗β,1,l , e1,l}l=1,...,n).
Lemma 5 For any machine B, there exists a probabilistic machine E , whose running time
is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvP2B (λ) ≤
AdvDLINE (λ) + 5/q.
Lemma 6 Let en : =(0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ F nq . For all x ∈ F nq \ span〈en〉 and π ∈ Fq , let
Wx,π : ={(r , w) ∈ (span〈x, en〉 \ span〈en〉) × (F nq \ span〈en〉⊥) | r · w = π}.












, for all (r , w) ∈ Wx,(x ·v),
Pr
[ xU = r ∧ vZ = w ] = 1/Wx,(x ·v), where U U← H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq) and Z :
=(U−1)T.
6.4.2 Proof outline
At the top level of strategy of the security proof, we follow the dual system encryption
methodology proposed by Waters [31]. In the methodology, ciphertexts and secret keys have
two forms, normal and semi-functional. In the proof herein, we also introduce other forms of
secret keys called 1st-pre-semi-functional and 2nd-pre-semi-functional. The real system uses
only normal ciphertexts and normal secret keys, and semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-
functional/1st-pre-semi-functional/2nd-pre-semi-functional keys are used only in a sequence
of security games for the security proof. To prove this theorem, we employ Game 0 (original
adaptive-security game) through Game 3. In Game 1, the challenge ciphertext is changed to
semi-functional. When at most ν secret key queries are issued by an adversary, there are 3ν
game changes from Game 1 (Game 2-0-3), Game 2-1-1, Game 2-1-2, Game 2-1-3 through
Game 2-ν-3.
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In Game 2-h-1, the first (h − 1) keys are semi-functional and the h-th key is 1st-pre-
semi-functional, while the remaining keys are normal, and the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional. In Game 2-h-2, the first (h − 1) keys are semi-functional and the h-th key is
2nd-pre-semi-functional, while the remaining keys are normal, and the challenge ciphertext
is semi-functional. In Game 2-h-3, the first h keys are semi-functional (i.e., and the h-th
key is semi-functional), while the remaining keys are normal, and the challenge ciphertext is
semi-functional.
The final game (Game 3) with advantage 0 is conceptually changed from Game 2-ν-3. As
usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible.
When at most ν key queries are issued by an adversary, we set a sequence of sk : =skv’s,
i.e., (sk(1)∗, . . . , sk(ν)∗), in the order of the adversary’s queries. Here we focus on k(h)∗v :
=(k(h)∗0 , k(h)∗1 ), and cx : =(c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3), and ignore the other part of skv
(resp.ctx ), i.e., v (resp. i.e., x), and call them secret key and ciphertext, respectively, in this
proof outline. In addition, we ignore a negligible factor in the (informal) descriptions of this
proof outline. For example, we say “A is bounded by B” when A ≤ B + (λ) where (λ) is
negligible in security parameter λ.
A normal secret key, k(h)∗normv , is the correct form of the secret key of the proposed NIPE
scheme, and is expressed by Eq. (7). Similarly, a normal ciphertext c normx , is expressed by
Eq. (8). A 1st-pre-semi-functional secret key, k(h)∗ 1st-psemiv , is expressed by Eq. (10), a 2nd-
pre-semi-functional secret key, k(h)∗ 2nd-psemiv , is expressed by Eq. (11), a semi-functional
secret key, k(h)∗ semiv , is expressed by Eq. (12), and a semi-functional ciphertext, c semix , is
expressed by Eq. (9).
To prove that the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 is bounded by the advantage of
Problem 1 (to guess β ∈ {0, 1}), we construct a simulator of the challenger of Game 0 (or 1)
(against an adversary A) by using an instance with β U← {0, 1} of Problem 1. We then show
that the distribution of the secret keys and challenge ciphertext replied by the simulator is
equivalent to those of Game 0 when β = 0 and Game 1 when β = 1. That is, the advantage
gap betweenGames 0 and 1 is bounded by the advantage of Problem1 (Lemma 7). The advan-
tage of Problem 1 is proven to be bounded by that of the DLIN assumption (Lemma 4). The
advantage gap between Games 2-(h−1)-3 and 2-h-1 is similarly shown to be bounded by the
advantage of Problem 2 (i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption) (Lemmas 8 and 5). The dis-
tributions of 1st-pre-semi-functional secret key k(h)∗ 1st-psemiv (Eq. (10)) and 2nd-pre-semi-
functional secret key k(h)∗ 2nd-psemiv (Eq. (11)) are distinguishable by the simulator or chal-
lenger, but the joint distributions of (k(h)∗ 1st-psemiv , c semix ) and (k
(h)∗ 2nd-psemi
v , c semix ) along
with the other keys are (information theoretically) equivalent for the adversary’s view, when
x · v = 0, i.e., RNIPE(x, v) = 1. Therefore, as shown in Lemma 9, the advantages of Games 2-
h-1 and 2-h-2 are equivalent. The advantage gap between Games 2-h-2 and 2-h-3 is similarly
shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 2 (i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption)
(Lemmas 10 and 5). Finally we show that Game 2-ν-3 can be conceptually changed to Game
3 (Lemma 11) by using the fact that basis vectors b0,2 and b∗0,3 are unknown to the adversary.
6.4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we consider the following (3ν +3) games. In Game 0, a part framed by
a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part
framed by a box indicates coefficients that were changed in a game from the previous game.
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Game 0 Original game. That is, the reply to a key query for v is
k∗0 : =
(
δ, 0 , 1, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , k
∗







U← Fq , ϕ1 U← Fnq and v : =(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ F nq with vn = 0. The challenge
ciphertext for challenge plaintexts (m(0),m(1)) and x , (x, c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3), which
is identified with (x, c0, c1, c3) in Remark 3, is
c0 : =(−ω, 0 , ζ , 0, η0)B0 , c1 : =(ωx, 0n , 0n, η1 x)B1 , c3 : =gζTm, (8)
where b
U← {0, 1};ω, ζ, η0, η1 U← Fq and x : =(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F nq with xl = 0 for some
l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}.
Game 1 Same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext for challenge plaintexts
(m(0),m(1)) and x is
c0 : =(−ω, −τ , ζ, 0, η0)B0 , c1 : =(ωx, τ xU , 0n, η1 x)B1 , c3 : =gζTm, (9)
where τ
U← Fq ,U U← H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq), and all the other variables are generated as in
Game 0.
Game 2-h-1(h= 1, . . ., ν) Game 2-0-3 is Game 1. Game 2-h-1 is the same as Game 2-
(h − 1)-3 except that the reply to the h-th key query for v, (k∗0, k∗1), is
k∗0 : =(δ, ρ , 1, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , k∗1 : =(δv, ρvZ , ϕ1, 0n)B∗1 , (10)
where ρ
U← Fq , Z : =(U−1)T for U U← H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq) used in Eq. (9) and all the
other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1)-3.
Game 2-h-2(h= 1, . . ., ν) Game 2-h-2 is the same as Game 2-h-1 except that a part of the
reply to the h-th key query for v, (k∗0, k∗1), is
k∗0 : =(δ, w , 1, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , k∗1 : =(δv, ρvZ , ϕ1, 0n)B∗1 , (11)
where w
U← Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-1.
Game 2-h-3(h= 1, . . ., ν) Game 2-h-3 is the same as Game 2-h-2 except that the reply to
the h-th key query for v, (k∗0, k∗1), is
k∗0 : =(δ, w, 1, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , k∗1 : =(δv, 0n , ϕ1, 0n)B∗1 , (12)
where all the variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2.
Game 3 Same as Game 2-ν-3 except that c0 and c3 of the challenge ciphertext are
c0 : =(−ω, −τ, ζ ′ , 0, η0)B0 , c3 : =gζTm(b),
where ζ ′ U← Fq (i.e., independent from ζ U← Fq ), and all the other variables are generated





A (λ) (h = 1, . . . , ν; ι = 1, 2, 3) and Adv(3)A (λ) be
the advantage of A in Game 0, 1, 2-h-ι and 3, respectively. Adv(0)A (λ) is equivalent to
AdvNIPE,PHA (λ) and it is obtained thatAdv
(3)
A (λ) = 0 byLemma12.Wewill showfive lemmas
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for h = 1, . . . , ν; ι = 1, 2, 3 and Adv(3)A (λ). From these lemmas and Lemmas 4 and 5, we
obtain Theorem 1. unionsq
Lemma 7 For any machine A, there exists a probabilistic machine B1, whose running time
is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv(0)A (λ) −
Adv(1)A (λ)| ≤ AdvP1B1 (λ).
Lemma 8 For any machine A, there exists a probabilistic machine B2-1, whose run-
ning time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
|Adv(2-(h−1)-3)A (λ) − Adv(2-h-1)A (λ)| ≤ AdvP2B2-h-1(λ), where B2-h-1(·) : =B2-1(h, ·).
Lemma 9 For anymachineA, for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-h-1)A (λ)−Adv(2-h-2)A (λ)|≤ 1/q.
Lemma 10 For any machine A, there exists a probabilistic machine B2-2, whose run-
ning time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
|Adv(2-h-2)A (λ) − Adv(2-h-3)A (λ)| ≤ AdvP2B2-h-2(λ), where B2-h-2(·) : =B2-2(h, ·).
Lemma 11 For anymachineA, for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-ν-3)A (λ)−Adv(3)A (λ)| ≤
1/q.
Lemma 12 For any machine A, for any security parameter λ, Adv(3)A (λ) = 0.
7 NIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys
7.1 Dual orthonormal basis generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator GNIPE,SKob below, which is used as a
subroutine in the proposed NIPE scheme, where GNIPE,CTob is given in Sect. 6.2.
GNIPE,SKob (1λ, 4, n) : (paramn, D0, D∗0, {Di, j , D′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, D∗1)
R← GNIPE,CTob
(1λ, 4, n),
B0 : =D∗0, B∗0 : =D0, B1 : =D∗1, B∗i, j : =Di, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l : =D′i, j,l
for i, j = 1, . . . , 4; l = 1, . . . , n,
return (paramn, B0, B
∗
0, B1, {B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n).
Remark 6 From Remark 2, {B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n is identified with basis B∗1 :
=(b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,4n) dual to B1.
7.2 Construction and security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, v : =(v1, . . . , vn), has an index
l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with vl = 0, and that input vector, x : =(x1, . . . , xn), satisfies xn = 0.
The plaintext space is GT .
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Setup(1λ, n) :(paramn, B0, B∗0, B1, {B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4; l=1,...,n) R←GNIPE,SKob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, b0,5), B̂∗0 : =(b∗0,1, b∗0,3, b∗0,4),
B̂1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n, b1,3n+1, . . . , b1,4n),
return pk : =(1λ,paramn, {B̂t }t=0,1), sk : =(B̂∗0, {B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,3; j=1,...,4; l=1,...,n).
KeyGen(pk, sk, v) : δ, ϕ0, ϕ1 U← Fq , k∗0 : =(δ, 0, 1, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 ,
K ∗1, j : =δB∗1, j + ϕ1B∗3, j , K ∗2, j : =
∑n
l=1 vl(δB ′ ∗1, j,l + ϕ1B ′ ∗3, j,l) for j = 1, . . . , 4,
return skv : =(v, k∗0, {K ∗1, j , K ∗2, j } j=1,...,4).
Enc(pk, m, x) : ω, η0, ζ U← Fq , η1 U← Fnq , c0 : =(−ω, 0, ζ, 0, η0)B0 ,
c1 : =(ωx, 0n, 0n, η1)B1 , c3 : =gζTm, return ctx : =(x, c0, c1, c3).
Dec(pk, skv : =(v, k∗0, {K ∗1, j , K ∗2, j } j=1,...,4), ctx : =(x, c0, c1, c3)) :
Parse c1 as a 4n-tuple (C1, . . . ,C4n) ∈ G4n,
Dj : =∑n−1l=1 ((x · v)−1vl)C( j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 4,




e(Dj , K ∗1, j ) · e(C jn, K ∗2, j )
)
, return m′ : =c3/F.
Remark 7 A part of output of Setup(1λ, n), {B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,3; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , can be iden-
tified with B̂∗1 : =(b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,n, b∗1,2n+1, . . . , b∗1,3n), while B∗1 : =(b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,4n) is
identified with {B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n in Remark 6. Decryption Dec can be alter-
natively described as:







v1K ∗1,1, . . . , vn−1K ∗1,1, K ∗2,1, . . . , v1K ∗1,4, . . . , vn−1K ∗1,4, K ∗2,4
)
,
that is, k∗1 = (δv, 0n, 0n, ϕ1v)B∗1 , F : =e(c0, k∗0) · e((x · v)−1c1, k∗1),
return m′ : =c3/F.
Theorem 2 The proposed NIPE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plain-
text attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any machine A, there exist probabilistic machines E1, E2-1 and E2-2 whose run-
ning times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter







E2-h-1(·) : =E2-1(h, ·), E2-h-2(·) : =E2-2(h, ·), ν is the maximum number of A’s key queries
and  : =(11ν + 6)/q.
Theorem 2 is proven similarly to Theorem 1.
8 ZIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts
8.1 Dual orthonormal basis generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator GZIPE,CTob below, which is used as a
subroutine in the proposed Zero IPE scheme. Since the definition is employed for the scheme
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with w = 5 in Sect. 10, we describe GZIPE,CTob for general w. (We use only the cases with
w = 4, 5).
GZIPE,CTob (1λ, w, n) : paramG : =(q, G, GT ,G, e)
R← Gbpg(1λ), N : =wn + 1,
ψ
U← F×q , gT : =e(G,G)ψ , paramV : =(q, V, GT , A, e) : =Gdpvs(1λ, N ,paramG),
paramn : =(paramV, gT ), X U← L+(w, n, Fq), hereafter,
{χ0,0, χ0, j , χi,0,l , μi, j , μ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...w;l=1,...,n denotes non-zero entries of X,
where {μi, j , μ′i, j,l} are non-zero entries of submatrices Xi, j of X
as given in Eqs. (5) and (1), (ϑi, j )i, j=0,...,wn : =ψ · (XT)−1,
B0,0 : =χ0,0G, B0, j : =χ0, j G, Bi,0,l : =χi,0,lG, Bi, j : =μi, j G, B ′i, j,l : =μ′i, j,lG
for i, j = 1, . . . , w; l = 1, . . . , n,
b∗i : =(ϑi,1, . . . , ϑi,N )A =
∑wn
j=0 ϑi, j a j for i = 0, . . . , wn, B∗ : =(b∗0, . . . , b∗wn),
return (paramn, {B0,0, B0, j , Bi,0,l , Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,w;l=1,...,n, B∗).
Remark 8 {B0,0, B0, j , Bi,0,l , Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,w;l=1,...,n is identified with basis B : =
(b0, . . . , bwn) dual to B∗ as in Remark 2.
8.2 Construction and security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, x : =(x1, . . . , xn), has an
index l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with xl = 0, and that input vector, v : =(v1, . . . , vn), satisfies
vn = 0. The plaintext space is GT .
Setup(1λ, n) :
(paramn, {B0,0, B0, j , Bi,0,l , Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4; l=1,...,n, B∗) R← GZIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂
∗ : =(b∗0, . . . , b∗n, b∗2n+1, . . . , b∗3n),
return pk : =(1λ,paramn, {B0,0, B0, j , Bi,0,l , Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n),
sk : =B̂∗.













return skv : =k∗.
Enc(pk, m, x) : ω, η, ζ U← Fq , C0 : =ζ B0,0 + ∑nl=1 xl(ωB1,0,l + ηB4,0,l),
c3 : =gζTm, C1, j : =ωB1, j + ηB4, j ,
C2, j : =ζ B0, j + ∑nl=1 xl(ωB ′1, j,l + ηB ′4, j,l) for j = 1, . . . , 4,
return ctx : =(x,C0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3).
Dec(pk, skv : =k∗, ctx : =(x,C0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3)) :
Parse k∗ as a (4n + 1)-tuple (K ∗0 , . . . , K ∗4n) ∈ G4n+1,
D∗j : =
∑n−1
l=1 xl K ∗( j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 4,




e(C1, j , D∗j ) · e(C2, j , K ∗jn)
)
, return m′ : =c3/F.
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Remark 9 A part of output of Setup(1λ, n), {B0,0, B0, j , Bi,0,l , Bi, j ,
B ′i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , can be identified with B̂ : =(b0, . . . , bn, b3n+1, . . . , b4n), while
B : =(b0, . . . , b4n) is identified with {B0,0, B0, j , Bi,0,l , Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n in
Remark 8. Decryption Dec can be alternatively described as:





c : = ( C0, x1C1,1, . . . , xn−1C1,1,C2,1, . . . , x1C1,4, . . . , xn−1C1,4,C2,4
)
,












ηx )B, F : =e(c, k∗), return m′ : =c3/F.
[Correctness] Using the alternate decryptionDec′, F = e(c, k) = gζ+ωδx ·vT = gζT if x · v =
0.
Remark 10 The proposed ZIPE in this section employs a single basis, B, generated by
X ∈ GL(4n + 1, Fq) [or X ∈ L+(4, n, Fq) of Eq. (5)], and a ciphertext can be expressed
as (c, gζTm) with c = (ζ, ωx, 02n, ηx)B as shown in Remark 9. The proposed NIPE
scheme in Sect. 6.3 employs two bases, B0 and B1, generated by X0 ∈ GL(5, Fq)
and X1 ∈ GL(4n, Fq), and a ciphertext can be expressed as (c0, c1, gζTm) with c0 :=(−ω, 0, ζ, 0, η0)B0 and c1 = (ωx, 02n, η1 x)B1 . Hence, the ciphertext and secret key
of the ZIPE scheme are shorter than those of the NIPE scheme (see Table 1 in Sect. 11). It is
due to the difference of the decryption tricks in the ZIPE and NIPE schemes. Similarly to the
fact on L(4, n, Fq) (for the security of the NIPE scheme) shown in Sect. 6.1, it is crucial for
the security of the ZIPE scheme that L+(4, n, Fq) is a subgroup of GL(4n+ 1, Fq) (Lemma
3), and its security proof is made in the essentially same manner as explained in Sect. 6.1.
Theorem 3 The proposed ZIPE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plain-
text attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any machine A, there exist probabilistic
machines E1 and E2, whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for




E2-h (λ) + , whereE2-h(·) : =E2(h, ·), ν is the maximum number of A’s key queries, and  : =(11ν + 6)/q.
Proof To prove Theorem 3, we consider the following (ν + 3) games. In Game 0, a part
framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other
games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients that were changed in a game from the
previous game.
Game 0 Original game. That is, the reply to a key query for v is
k∗ : =
(





U← Fq , ϕ U← Fnq and v : =(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ F nq with vn = 0. The challenge cipher-
text for challenge plaintexts (m(0),m(1)) and x , (x, c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3), which is
identified with (x, c, c3) in Remark 9, is
c : =
(
ζ , ωx, 0n , 0n, ηx
)
B
, c3 : =gζTm,
where b
U← {0, 1};ω, ζ, η U← Fq and x : =(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F nq with xl = 0 for some
l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}.
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Game 1 Same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext for challenge plaintexts
(m(0),m(1)) and x is
c : =
(
ζ, ωx, r , 0n, ηx
)
B
, c3 : =gζTm,
where r U← span〈x, en〉, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0.
Game 2-h(h= 1, . . . ,ν) Game 2-0 is Game 1. Game 2-h is the same as Game 2-(h − 1)
except that a part of the reply to the h-th key query for v, k∗, is
k∗ : =( 1, δv, w , ϕ, 0n )B∗ ,
where w U← Fnq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1).
Game 3 Same as Game 2-ν except that c and c3 of the challenge ciphertext are
c : =
(
ζ ′ , ωx, r , 0n, ηx
)
B
, c3 : =gζTm(b),
where ζ ′ U← Fq (i.e., independent from ζ U← Fq ), and all the other variables are generated





A (λ) (h = 1, . . . , ν) and Adv(3)A (λ) be the advantage
of A in Game 0, 1, 2-h and 3, respectively. Adv(0)A (λ) is equivalent to AdvZIPE,PHA (λ) and
Adv(3)A (λ) = 0.We can evaluate the gaps between pairs ofAdv(0)A (λ),Adv(1)A (λ),Adv(2-h)A (λ)
for h = 1, . . . , ν using (variants of) Problems 1 and 2 as in the proof of Theorem 1. The
following Lemma 13 gives a gap evaluation between Adv(2-ν-2)A (λ) and Adv
(3)
A (λ), which
requires a detailed proof for our ZIPE with constant-size ciphertexts (see Appendix “Proof
of Lemma 13 in Sect. 8” for the proof). Combining the gap evaluations, we obtain Theorem
3. unionsq
Lemma 13 For any machine A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-ν)A (λ)−Adv(3)A (λ)| ≤
1/q.
9 ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys
9.1 Dual orthonormal basis generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator GZIPE,SKob below, which is used as a
subroutine in the proposed ZIPE scheme, where GZIPE,CTob is defined in Sect. 7.1. Since the
definition is employed for the scheme with w = 5 in Sect. 10, we describe GZIPE,SKob for
general w. (We use only the cases with w = 4, 5).
GZIPE,SKob (1λ, w, n) :
(paramn, {D0,0, D0, j , Di,0,l , Di, j , D′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,w;l=1,...,n, D∗) R← GZIPE,CTob (1λ, w, n),
B : =D∗, B∗0,0 : =D0,0, B∗0, j : =D0, j , B∗i,0,l : =Di,0,l , B∗i, j : =Di, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l : =D′i, j,l
for i, j = 1, . . . , w; l = 1, . . . , n,
return (paramn, B, {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,w;l=1,...,n).
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Remark 11 {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,w;l=1,...,n is identified with basis B∗ :
=(b∗0, . . . , b∗wn) dual to B as in Remark 6.
9.2 Construction and security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, v : =(v1, . . . , vn), has an index
l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with vl = 0, and that input vector, x : =(x1, . . . , xn), satisfies xn = 0.
The plaintext space is GT .
Setup(1λ, n) : (paramn, B, {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n) R← GZIPE,SKob
(1λ, 4, n),
B̂ : =(b0, . . . , bn, b3n+1, . . . , b4n),
return pk : =(1λ,paramn, B̂), sk : ={B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,3; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n .
KeyGen(pk, sk, v) : δ, ϕ U← Fq , K ∗0 : =B∗0,0 +
∑n
l=1 vl(δB∗1,0,l + ϕB∗3,0,l),
K ∗1, j : =δB∗1, j + ϕB∗3, j , K ∗2, j : =B∗0, j +
∑n
l=1 vl(δB ′ ∗1, j,l + ϕB ′ ∗3, j,l) for j = 1, . . . , 4,
return skv : =(v, K ∗0 , {K ∗1, j , K ∗2, j } j=1,...,4).












η )B, c3 : =gζTm,
return ctx : =(c, c3).
Dec(pk, skv : =(v, K ∗0 , {K ∗1, j , K ∗2, j } j=1,...,4), ctx : =(c, c3)) :
Parse c as a (4n + 1)-tuple (C0, . . . ,C4n) ∈ G4n+1,
Dj : =∑n−1l=1 vlC( j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 4,




e(Dj , K ∗1, j ) · e(C jn, K ∗2, j )
)
, return m′ : =c3/F.
Remark 12 A part of output of Setup(1λ, n), {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j ,
B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,3; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , can be identifiedwith B̂∗ : =(b∗0, . . . , b∗n, b∗2n+1, . . . , b∗3n), while
B
∗ : =(b∗0, . . . , b∗4n) is identified with {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,...,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n
in Remark 11. Decryption Dec can be alternatively described as:





k∗ : = ( K ∗0 , v1K ∗1,1, . . . , vn−1K ∗1,1, K ∗2,1, . . . , v1K ∗1,4, . . . , vn−1K ∗1,4, K ∗2,4
)
,












0n )B∗ , F : =e(c, k∗),
return m′ : =c3/F.
[Correctness] Using the alternate decryptionDec′, F = e(c, k) = gζ+ωδx ·vT = gζT if x · v =
0.
Theorem 4 The proposedZIPE scheme is adaptivelyweakly-attribute-hiding against chosen
plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any machine A, there exist probabilistic
machines E1 and E2, whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for




E2-h (λ) + , whereE2-h(·) : =E2(h, ·), ν is the maximum number of A’s key queries, and  : =(11ν + 6)/q.
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Proof To prove Theorem 4, we consider the following (ν + 3) games. In Game 0, a part
framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other
games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients that were changed in a game from the
previous game.
Game 0 Original game. That is, the reply to a key query for v is
k∗ : =( 1, δv, 0n , ϕv, 0n )
B∗ ,
where δ, ϕ
U← Fq and v : =(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ F nq with vn = 0. The challenge ciphertext for
challenge plaintexts (m(0),m(1)) and x , (x, c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3), which is identified
with (x, c, c3) in Remark 9, is
c : =( ζ , ωx , 0n , 0n, η )
B
, c3 : =gζTm,
where b
U← {0, 1};ω, ζ U← Fq , η U← Fnq and x : =(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F nq with xl = 0 for some
l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}.
Game 1 Same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext for challenge plaintexts
(m(0),m(1)) and x is
c : =( ζ, ωx, r , 0n, η )
B
, c3 : =gζTm,
where r U← F nq , and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0.
Game 2-h(h= 1, . . ., ν) Game 2-0 is Game 1. Game 2-h is the same as Game 2-(h − 1)
except that a part of the reply to the h-th key query for v, k∗, is
k∗ : =( 1, δv, w , ϕv, 0n )
B∗ ,
where w U← span〈v, en〉 and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1).
Game 3 Same as Game 2-ν except that c and c3 of the challenge ciphertext are
c : =( ζ ′ , x ′ , r , 0n, η )
B
, c3 : =gζTm(b),
where ζ ′ U← Fq (i.e., independent from ζ U← Fq ), x ′ U← Fnq (i.e., independent from x U← Fnq ),





A (λ) (h = 1, . . . , ν) and Adv(3)A (λ) be the advantage
of A in Game 0, 1, 2-h and 3, respectively. Adv(0)A (λ) is equivalent to AdvZIPE,wAHA (λ) and
Adv(3)A (λ) = 0.We can evaluate the gaps between pairs ofAdv(0)A (λ),Adv(1)A (λ),Adv(2-h)A (λ)
for h = 1, . . . , ν using (variants of) Problems 1 and 2 as in the proof of Theorem 1. The
following Lemma 14 gives a gap evaluation between Adv(2-ν)A (λ) and Adv
(3)
A (λ), which
requires a detailed proof for our ZIPE with constant-size secret-keys (see Appendix “Proof
of Lemma 14 in Sect. 9” for the proof). Combining the gap evaluations, we obtain Theorem
4. unionsq
Lemma 14 For any machine A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-ν)A (λ)−Adv(3)A (λ)| ≤
1/q.
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10 Fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys
By applying our technique to the fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme in [27], we obtain a
fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme with short secret-keys.
10.1 Construction and security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, v : =(v1, . . . , vn), has an index
l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with vl = 0, and that input vector, x : =(x1, . . . , xn), satisfies xn = 0.
The plaintext space is GT .
Setup(1λ, n) : (paramn, B, {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i, j=1,...,5;l=1,...,n) R← GZIPE,SKob
(1λ, 5, n),
B̂ : =(b0, . . . , bn, b4n+1, . . . , b5n),
returnpk : =(1λ,paramn, B̂), sk : ={B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,5;l=1,...,n .
KeyGen(pk, sk, v) : δ, ϕ U← Fq , K ∗0 : =B∗0,0 +
∑n
l=1 vl(δB∗1,0,l + ϕB∗4,0,l),
K ∗1, j : =δB∗1, j + ϕB∗4, j , K ∗2, j : =B∗0, j +
∑n
l=1 vl(δB ′ ∗1, j,l + ϕB ′ ∗4, j,l) for j = 1, . . . , 5,
return skv : =(v, K ∗0 , {K ∗1, j , K ∗2, j } j=1,...,5).














return ctx : =(c, c3).
Dec(pk, skv : =(v, K ∗0 , {K ∗1, j , K ∗2, j } j=1,...,5), ctx : =(c, c3)) :
Parse c as a (5n + 1)-tuple (C0, . . . ,C5n) ∈ G5n+1,
Dj : =∑n−1l=1 vlC( j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 5,




e(Dj , K ∗1, j ) · e(C jn, K ∗2, j )
)
, return m′ : =c3/F.
Remark 13 A part of output of Setup(1λ, n), {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j ,
B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,5;l=1,...,n , can be identifiedwith B̂∗ : =(b∗0, . . . , b∗n, b∗3n+1, . . . , b∗4n), while
B
∗ : =(b∗0, . . . , b∗5n) is identified with {B∗0,0, B∗0, j , B∗i,0,l , B∗i, j , B ′ ∗i, j,l}i=1,...,5; j=1,...,5;l=1,...,n
in Remark 11. Decryption Dec can be alternatively described as:





k∗ : = ( K ∗0 , v1K ∗1,1, . . . , vn−1K ∗1,1, K ∗2,1, . . . , v1K ∗1,5, . . . , vn−1K ∗1,5, K ∗2,5
)
,












0n )B∗ , F : =e(c, k∗),
return m′ : =c3/F.
[Correctness] Using the alternate decryptionDec′, F = e(c, k) = gζ+ωδx ·vT = gζT if x · v =
0.
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Theorem 5 The proposed ZIPE scheme is adaptively fully-attribute-hiding against chosen
plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any machine A, there exist probabilistic machines E0-1, E0-2, E1-1, E1-2-1 and E1-2-2,
whose running times are essentially the sameas that ofA, such that for any security parameter




AdvDLINE0-2-h (λ) + AdvDLINE1-2-h-1(λ)
+AdvDLINE1-2-h-2(λ)
)
+, where E0-2-h(·) : =E0-2(h, ·), E1-2-h-1(·) : =E1-2-1(h, ·), E1-2-h-2(·) :
=E1-2-2(h, ·), ν is the maximum number of A’s key queries and  : =(29ν + 17)/q.
Proof Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 in [27], the proof of Theorem 5 is reduced to that
of Lemma 15.
First, we execute a preliminary game transformation fromGame 0 (original security game
in Definition 6) to Game 0’, which is the same as Game 0 except that flip a coin t
U← {0, 1}
before setup, and the game is aborted in the challenge step if t = s.We define thatAwinswith
probability 1/2 when the game is aborted (and the advantage in Game 0’ isPr[Awins ]−1/2
as well). Since t is independent from s, the game is aborted with probability 1/2. Hence, the
advantage in Game 0’ is a half of that in Game 0, i.e.,AdvIPE,AH,0
′
A (λ) = 1/2 ·AdvIPE,AHA (λ).
Moreover, Pr[A wins] = 1/2 · (Pr[A wins | t = 0] + Pr[A wins | t = 1]) in Game 0’ since
t is uniformly and independently generated.
As for the conditional probability with t = 0, it holds that, for any adversary A, there
exist probabilistic machines E1 and E2, whose running times are essentially the same as that





E2-h (λ) + , where E2-h(·) : =E2(h, ·) and ν is the maximum
number of A’s key queries and  : =(6ν + 5)/q . This is obtained in the same manner as
the weakly attribute-hiding security of the OT10 IPE in the full version of [25]: Since the
difference between our IPE and the OT10 IPE is only the dimension of the hidden subspaces,
i.e., the former has 2n and the latter has n, the weakly attribute-hiding security of the OT10
IPE implies the security with t = 0 of our IPE.
As for the conditional probability with t = 1, i.e., Pr[A wins | t = 1], Lemma 15 holds.
Therefore, AdvZIPE,AHA (λ) = 2 · AdvZIPE,AH,0
′
A (λ) = Pr[A wins | t = 0] + Pr[A wins | t =











 : =(29ν + 17)/q . unionsq
Lemma 15 For any machine A, there exist probabilistic machines E1, E2-1 and E2-2, whose
running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parame-







+ , where E2-h-1(·) : =E2-1(h, ·),
E2-h-2(·) : =E2-2(h, ·), ν is the maximum number of A’s key queries and  : =(23ν + 12)/q.
Proof To prove Lemma 15, we consider the following 4ν + 3 games when t = 1. In Game
0’, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the
other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game
from the previous game.
Game 0’ Same as Game 0 except that flip a coin t
U← {0, 1} before setup, and the game is
aborted in the challenge step if t = s. In order to prove Lemma 15, we consider the case
with t = 1.
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The reply to a key query for v is:
k∗ : =( 1, δv, 0n , 0n , ϕv, 0n )
B∗ ,
where δ, ϕ
U← Fq . The challenge ciphertext for challenge plaintextm : =m(0) = m(1) and
vectors (x (0), x (1)) is:
c : =( ζ, ωx (b) , 0n , 0n , 0n, η )
B
, c3 : =gζTm,
where b
U← {0, 1} and ζ, ω U← Fq and η U← Fnq . Here, we note that c3 is independent from
bit b.
Game 1 Game 1 is the same as Game 0’ except that c1 of the challenge ciphertext for
(challenge plaintext m : =m(0) = m(1) and) vectors (x (0), x (1)) is:
c1 : =
(
ζ, ωx (b), ω′ x (b) , 0n, 0n, η )
B
,
where ω′ U← Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0’.
Game 2-h-1(h= 1, . . . ,ν) Game 2-0-4 is Game 1. Game 2-h-1 is the same as Game 2-
(h − 1)-4 except that c1 of the challenge ciphertext for (challenge plaintext m : =m(0) =
m(1) and) vectors (x (0), x (1)) is:
c1 : =
(




where ω′, ω′′0 , ω′′1
U← Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1)-4.
Game 2-h-2(h= 1, . . ., ν) Game 2-h-2 is the same as Game 2-h-1 except that the reply
to the h-th key query for v is:
k∗ : =( 1, σ v, σ ′ v , 0n, ϕv, 0n )
B∗ ,
where σ ′ U← Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-1.
Game 2-h-3(h= 1, . . . ,ν) Game 2-h-3 is the same as Game 2-h-2 except that c1 of the









U← Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2.
Game 2-h-4(h= 1, . . . ,ν) Game 2-h-4 is the same as Game 2-h-3 except that the reply
to the h-th key query for v is:
k∗ : =( 1, σ v, 0n , σ ′′ v , ϕv, 0n )
B∗ ,
where σ ′′ U← Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-3.
Game 3 Game 3 is the same as Game 2-ν-4 except that c1 of the challenge ciphertext
for (challenge plaintexts m : =m(0) = m(1) and) vectors (x (0), x (1)) is:
c1 : =
(





U← Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν-4. Here, we
note that c1 is independent from bit b
U← {0, 1}.
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A (λ) be the advan-
tage of A in Game 0′, 1, 2-h-1, . . . , 2-h-4 and 3 when t = 1, respectively. Adv(0′)A (λ) is
equivalent to the left-hand side of Eq. (15) and Adv(3)A (λ) = 0.




A (λ), . . . ,
Adv(2-ν-4)A (λ),Adv
(3)
A (λ), similarly to [27]. This completes the proof of Lemma 15. unionsq
11 Comparison
Table 1 compares the proposed ZIPE and NIPE schemes (ZIPE with short ciphertexts in
Sect. 8, NIPE with short ciphertexts in Sect. 6, ZIPE with short secret-keys in Sect. 9, NIPE
with short secret-keys in Sect. 7, and fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE with short secret-keys in
Sect. 10) with the ZIPE and NIPE schemes in [4] that are secure under standard assumptions.
12 Hierarchical ZIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts
The proposed hierarchical ZIPE (HIPE) scheme with short ciphertexts is constructed by
using two vector spaces, 5-dimensionalV0 and 4n-dimensionalV1, where hierarchical vector
(v1, . . . , v) (resp. (x1, . . . , x′)) of secret-key (resp. ciphertext) is embedded in an element
in V1. The delegation mechanism is based on the payload hiding HIPE scheme given in
Appendix H.3 in the full version of [25].
12.1 Dual orthonormal basis generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator GHIPE,CTob below, which is used as a
subroutine in the proposed hierarchical ZIPE scheme.
GHIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n : =(d; n1, . . . , nd)) : n : =
∑d
t=1 nt ,
paramG : =(q, G, GT ,G, e) R← Gbpg(1λ), N0 : =5, N1 : =4n,
paramVt : =(q, Vt , GT , At , e) : =Gdpvs(1λ, Nt ,paramG) for t = 0, 1,
ψ
U← F×q , gT : =e(G,G)ψ , paramn : =(n, {paramVt }t=0,1, gT ),
X0 : =(χ0,i, j )i, j=1,...,5 U← GL(N0, Fq), X1 U← L˜(4, n, Fq), hereafter,
{μi, j , μ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...4;l=1,...,n denotes non-zero entries of X1 as in Eq. (4),
b0,i : =(χ0,i,1, . . . , χ0,i,5)A = ∑5j=1 χ0,i, j a j for i = 1, . . . , 5, B0 : =(b0,1, . . . , b0,5),
Bi, j : =μi, j G, B ′i, j,l : =μ′i, j,lG for i, j = 1, . . . , 4; l = 1, . . . , n,
for t = 0, 1, (ϑt,i, j )i, j=1,...,Nt : =ψ · (XTt )−1,
b∗t,i : =(ϑt,i,1, . . . , ϑt,i,Nt )A =
∑Nt
j=1 ϑt,i, j a j for i = 1, . . . , Nt , B∗t : =(b∗t,1, . . . , b∗t,Nt ),
return (paramn, B0, B∗0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B∗1).
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for i = 1, . . . , 4,
B1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,4n),
where a blank element in the matrix denotes 0 ∈ G. B1 is the dual orthonormal basis of B∗1,
i.e., e(b1,i , b∗1,i ) = gT and e(b1,i , b∗1, j ) = 1 for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ 4n.
12.2 Construction and security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, xt : =(xt,1, . . . , xt,nt ), has
an index (t, l) = (1, 1) with xt,l = 0, and that level-1 input vector, v1 : =(v1,1, . . . , v1,n1),
satisfies v1,1 = 0. The plaintext space is GT .
Setup(1λ, n : =(d; n1, . . . , nd)) : n : =∑dt=1 nt ,
(paramn, B0, B∗0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B∗1) R← GHIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, b0,5), B̂∗0 : =(b∗0,1, b∗0,4), B̂∗1 : =(b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,n, b∗1,2n+1, . . . , b∗1,3n),
return pk : =(1λ,paramn, B̂0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, {B̂∗t }t=0,1), sk : =b∗0,3.
KeyGen(pk, sk, (v1, . . . , v) ∈ Fn1q × · · · × Fnq ) :
st , θt , ϕ0
U← Fq for t = 1, . . . , , s0 : =∑t=1 st , ϕ1 U← Fnq ,




s1e1,1 + θ1v1, . . . , se,1 + θv, 0n+1 , . . . , 0nd , 0n, ϕ1, 0n )B∗1 ,
return sk : =((v1, . . . , v), k∗,0, k∗,1).
Enc(pk,m ∈ GT , (x1, . . . , x) ∈ Fn1q × · · · × Fnq ) :
ω, η0, η1
U← Fq , c0 : =(ω, 0, ζ, 0, η0)B0 , x : =(xl)l=1,...,n : =(x1, . . . , x, 0n+1 , . . . ,
0nd ) ∈ Fnq ,
C1, j : =ωB1, j + η1B4, j , C2, j : =∑nl=1 xl(ωB ′1, j,l + η1B ′4, j,l) for j = 1, . . . , 4,
c3 : =gζTm, return ct : =((x1, . . . , x), c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3).
Dec(pk, sk : =((v1, . . . , v),k∗,0,k∗,1), ct : =((x1, . . . , x′),c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3)) :
if  ≤ ′, parse k∗1 as a 4n-tuple (K ∗1 , . . . , K ∗4n) ∈ G4n,
x : =(x1, . . . , xn) : =(x1, . . . , x′ , 0n′+1 , . . . , 0nd ) ∈ Fnq ,
D∗j : =
∑n
l=2 xl K ∗( j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 4,




e(C1, j , D∗j ) · e(C2, j , K ∗( j−1)n+1)
)
, return m′ : =c3/F,
else, return ⊥.
Delegate(pk, sk, v+1) :
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sdel,t , θdel,t , ϕdel,0
U← Fq for t = 1, . . . ,  + 1, sdel,0 : =
∑+1
t=1 sdel,t , ϕdel,1 U← Fnq ,




sdel,1e1,1 + θ1v1, . . . , sdel,+1e+1,1 + θdel,+1v+1, 0n+2 , . . . , 0nd ,
0n, ϕdel,1, 0n )B∗1 ,
k∗+1,ι : =k∗,ι + k∗del,ι for ι = 0, 1,
return sk+1 : =((v1, . . . , v+1), k∗+1,0, k∗+1,1).
Remark 15 A part of output ofSetup(1λ, n), {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , can be iden-
tified with B̂1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n, b1,3n+1, . . . , b1,4n) through the form of Eq. (6), while
B1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,4n) is identified with {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4; l=1,...,n by Eq. (6). Decryp-
tion Dec can be alternatively described as:
Dec′(pk, sk : =((v1, . . . , v),k∗,0, k∗,1), ct : =((x1, . . . ,x′),c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3)) :







C2,1, x2C1,1, . . . , xnC1,1, . . . , C2,4, x2C1,4, . . . , xnC1,4
)
,












η1 x )B1 , F : =e(c0, k∗0) · e(c1, k∗1),
return m′ : =c3/F.





T = gζT if  ≤ ′ and xt · vt = 0 for t = 1, . . . , .
The definition of adaptively payload-hiding security and the advantage AdvHIPE,PHA (λ)
of adversary A can be obtained through a straightforward extension of that of HIBE, e.g.,
[15], with replacing ID-matching by vector-orthogonality.
Theorem 6 The proposed HIPE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plain-
text attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any machineA, there exist probabilistic machines E1 and E2, whose running times are





E2-h (λ) + , where E2-h(·) : =E2(h, ·), ν is the maximum number
of adversary A’s key queries, and  = (11ν + 6)/q.
Theorem 6 is proven similarly to Theorem 3.
13 Concluding remarks
The technique with using special type matrices shown in this paper can reduce the size of
ciphertexts or secret-keys of adaptively secure FE schemes in [25] from O(dn) to O(d),
where d is the number of sub-universes of attributes, and n is the maximal length of attribute
vectors. A key-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) system with constant-size ciphertext
[5] is selectively secure in the standard model. Therefore, it is an interesting open problem
to realize an adaptively secure and constant-size ciphertext ABE scheme.
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Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas
Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 in Sect. 5
For a positive integer x , let [x] : ={1, . . . , x}.
Lemma 2 L(w, n, Fq) and L˜(w, n, Fq) are subgroups of GL(wn, Fq).
Proof Below, we will show that L(w, n, Fq) is a subgroup of GL(wn, Fq). For L˜(w, n, Fq),
the lemma is proven in the same manner as for L(w, n, Fq).
Based on the block partition on X ∈ Fwn×wnq with submatrices Xi, j ∈ F n×nq , i.e., X :




X1,1 · · · X1,w
...
...
Xw,1 · · · Xw,w
⎞
⎟
⎠, we will define a permutation matrix. Since Xi, j ∈
F
n×n
q , each row of X is indexed by a pair (i, k)with i ∈ [w]; k ∈ [n], which is corresponding
to the ((i − 1)n + k)-th row. The swapping of the index pair (i, k) → (k, i) leads to a
permutation π on the set [wn] as,
π : [wn] → [wn]
∈ ∈
(i − 1)n + k → (k − 1)w + i
(13)
with i ∈ [w]; k ∈ [n]. We denote the corresponding permutation matrix by , i.e., the left
multiplication by  is equivalent to the permutation π on rows (of X ). −1 = T since 
is a permutation matrix, and we see that the right multiplication by −1 is equivalent to the
permutation π on columns (of X ).
Let the conjugate set P(w, n, Fq) : = · L(w, n, Fq) · −1. Since the rows and










































μ1,1 · · · μ1,w
...
...
μw,1 · · · μw,w
⎞
⎟




μ′1,1,i · · · μ′1,w,i
...
...
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L(w, n, Fq) ⊂ GL(wn, Fq),





























Y0, Yn ∈ GL(w, Fq),
Y1, . . . , Yn−1 ∈ Fw×wq ,
a blank element in the





We see thatP(w, n, Fq) is a subgroup ofGL(wn, Fq). So,L(w, n, Fq) = −1 ·P(w, n, Fq)·
 is also a subgroup of GL(wn, Fq). This completes the proof of Lemma 2. unionsq
Lemma 3 L+(w, n, Fq) is a subgroup of GL(wn + 1, Fq).
Proof For the proof, we define an injective group homomorphism,








We will show the following claim.
Claim 1 ι(L+(w, n, Fq)) = L(w + 1, n, Fq) ∩ ι(GL((w + 1)n, Fq)).
This equality is on the bottom-right corner of the following diagram,
ι : GL(wn + 1, Fq) ↪→ GL((w + 1)n, Fq)
∪ ∪
L+(w, n, Fq) ∼= ι(L+(w, n, Fq)) = L(w + 1, n, Fq) ∩ ι(GL((w + 1)n, Fq)).
Proof of Claim 1 Since X ∈ L(w + 1, n, Fq) ∩ ι(GL((w + 1)n, Fq)) is given




X1,1 · · · X1,w+1
...
...









































⎠ for j = 2, . . . , w+1,










μ′1,1,n μ′1,2,nen · · · μ′1,w+1,nen













where μ′i,1 : =(μ′i,1,1, . . . , μ′i,1,n). This shows that ι(L+(w, n, Fq)) = L(w + 1, n, Fq) ∩
ι(GL((w + 1)n, Fq)), i.e., Claim 1 holds. unionsq
Since L(w + 1, n, Fq) (and ι(GL((w + 1)n, Fq))) are subgroups of GL((w + 1)n, Fq)
(Lemma 2), from Claim 1, ι(L+(w, n, Fq)) is a subgroup of GL((w + 1)n, Fq). Therefore,
since ι is an injective group homomorphism, L+(w, n, Fq) is also a subgroup of GL(wn +
1, Fq). This completes the proof of Lemma 3. unionsq
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Fig. 1 Structure of reductions for Theorem 1
Proofs of Lemmas 4–12 in Sect. 6
Preliminaries
Figure 1 shows the structure of security reduction for Theorem 1, where the security of the
scheme is hierarchically reduced to the intractability of the DLIN problem. Basic Problems
0, 1, 2 are defined below. The reduction steps indicated by arrows will be shown below, and
the step given by dotted arrow can be shown in the same manner as that in (the full version
of) [25].
For the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5, we give the following intermediate problem, Basic
Problem 0 (Definition 10) and Lemma 16. (In [25], an additional element δξG is included in
an output of Basic Problem 0 for a shorter dimension 3n+1 than 4n. Here, it is not necessary.)
Definition 10 (Basic Problem 0) Basic Problem 0 is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given (paramBP0,
B̂, B∗, y∗β, f , κG, ξG)
R← GBP0β (1λ), where
GBP0β (1λ) : paramG : =(q, G, GT ,G, e) R← Gbpg(1λ),















⎠ : =(XT)−1, κ, ξ U← F×q ,
bi : =κ( χi )A = κ ∑3j=1 χi, j a j for i = 1, 3, B̂ : =(b1, b3),
b∗i : =ξ(ϑi )A = ξ
∑3
j=1 ϑi, j at, j for i = 1, 2, 3, B∗ : =(b∗1, b∗2, b∗3),
gT : =e(G,G)κξ , paramBP0 : =(paramV, gT ), δ, σ, ω U← Fq , ρ, τ U← F×q ,
y∗0 : =(δ, 0, σ )B∗ , y∗1 : =(δ, ρ, σ )B∗ , f : =(ω, τ, 0)B,
return (paramBP0, B̂, B
∗, y∗β, f , κG, ξG).
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for β
U← {0, 1}. For a probabilistic machine D, we define the advantage of D for Basic
Problem 0, AdvBP0D (λ), is similarly defined as in Definition 8.
Lemma 16 For any machine D, there is a probabilistic machine E , whose running time is
essentially the same as that of E , such that for any security parameter λ, AdvBP0D (λ) ≤
AdvDLINE (λ) + 5/q.
Proof We note that dual bases (B, B∗) in Basic Problem 0 are generated by a general linear
matrix X
U← GL(3, Fq), so Lemma 16 is proven in a similar manner to the security proof of
Basic Problem 0 in [25]. unionsq
The following Remark 16 is for the proofs of Lemmas of 17 and 19.
Remark 16 For matrix W := (χi, j )i, j=1,...,N ∈ F N×Nq and element v in N -dimensional
V, W (v) denotes
∑N ,N
i=1, j=1 χi, jφi, j (v) using canonical maps {φi, j } (Definition 2). Sim-
ilarly, for matrix (ϑi, j ) : =(W−1)T, (W−1)T(v) : =∑N ,Ni=1, j=1 ϑi, jφi, j (v). It holds that
e(W (x), (W−1)T( y)) = e(x, y) for any x, y ∈ V.
Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 For any machine B, there exists a probabilistic machine E , whose running times
are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvP1B (λ) ≤
AdvDLINE (λ) + 5/q.
Proof At the top level, the proof of Lemma 4 is similar to the security proof of Problem
1 in [25]. The main difference is that special form matrices Eq. (3) are used for generating
master public and secret keys in our schemes. One key fact for the security reduction is that
L(4, n, Fq) is a subgroup of GL(4n, Fq) (Lemma 2).
For the proof of Lemma 4, we give the following intermediate problem, Basic Problems
1 (Definition 11). From Lemmas 16, 17 and 18, we obtain Lemma 4. unionsq
Based on Remark 4, hereafter, we consider the output of GP1β (1λ, n) is expressed as
(paramn, B0, B̂
∗
0, eβ,0, B1, B̂
∗
1, {eβ,1,i }i=1,...,n) and also we give the output of Basic Problem
1 as such a vector form over bases {Bt }t=0,1.
Definition 11 (Basic Problem 1) Basic Problem 1 is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given (paramn,
{Bt , B̂∗t }t=0,1, f β,0, { f β,1,i }i=1,...,n) R← GBP1β (1λ, n), where
GBP1β (1λ, n) : (paramn, {Bt , B∗t }t=0,1) R← GNIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂
∗
0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, . . . , b0,5), B̂∗1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n, b1,2n+1, . . . , b1,4n),
ω, γ0, γ1
U← Fq , τ U← F×q , f 0,0 : =(ω, 0, 0, 0, γ0)B0 , f 1,0 : =(ω, τ, 0, 0, γ0)B0 ,
for i = 1, . . . , n;









f 0,1,i : =
(




f 1,1,i : =
(




return (paramn, {Bt , B̂∗t }t=0,1, f β,0, { f β,1,i }i=1,...,n).
123
Short ciphertexts or short secret-keys for adaptively secure general IPE 759
forβ
U← {0, 1}. For a probabilisticmachine C, we define the advantage of C for Basic Problem
1, AdvBP1C (λ), as in Definition 8.
Lemma 17 For any machine C, there is a probabilistic machine D, whose running time is
essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvBP1C (λ) ≤
AdvBP0D (λ).
Proof D is given a Basic Problem 0 instance
(paramBP0, B̂, B
∗, y∗β, f , κG, ξG).
By using paramG : =(q, G, GT ,G, e) underlying paramBP0, D calculates
param0 : =(q, V0, GT , A0, e) : =Gdpvs(1λ, 5,paramG),
param1 : =(q, V1, GT , A1, e) : =Gdpvs(1λ, 4n,paramG),
paramn : =({paramt }t=0,1, gT ),
where gT is contained in paramBP0.
D generates random linear transformation defined by matrices W0 U← GL(5, Fq) on V0
and W1
U← P(4, n, Fq) on V1 as in Remark 16, where P(4, n, Fq) is given in Eq. (14). Then
D sets
d0,ι : =W0(b∗ι , 0, 0) for ι = 1, 2, d0,3 : =W0(0, 0, 0, ξG, 0),
d0,4 : =W0(0, 0, 0, 0, ξG), d0,5 : =W0(b∗3, 0, 0),
d∗0,ι : =(W−10 )T(bι, 0, 0) for ι = 1, 2, d∗0,3 : =(W−10 )T(0, 0, 0, κG, 0),
d∗0,4 : =(W−10 )T(0, 0, 0, 0, κG), d∗0,5 : =(W−10 )T(b3, 0, 0),
gβ,0 : =W0( y∗β, 0, 0) + ηd0,5 where η U← Fq ,
for i = 1, . . . , n,
p1,4(i−1)+ι : =W1(04(i−1), b∗ι , 0, 04(n−i)) for ι = 1, 2,
p1,4(i−1)+3 : =W1(04(i−1), 03, ξG, 04(n−i)), p1,4i : =W1(04(i−1), b∗3, 0, 04(n−i)),
p∗1,4(i−1)+ι : =(W−11 )T(04(i−1), bι, 0, 04(n−i)) for ι = 1, 2,
p∗1,4(i−1)+3 : =(W−11 )T(04(i−1), 03, κG, 04(n−i)), p∗1,4i : =W1(04(i−1), b3, 0, 04(n−i)),
gβ,1,i : =W1(04(i−1), y∗β, 0, 04(n−i)),
where (04(i−1), v, 0, 04(n−i)) : =(04(i−1), G˜1, G˜2, G˜3, 0, 04(n−i)) for anyv : =(G˜1, G˜2, G˜3)
∈ V = G3. Then, D0 : =(d0,i )i=1,...,5 and D∗0 : =(d∗0,i )i=1,...,5, P1 : =( p1,i )i=1,...,4n and
P
∗
1 : =( p∗1,i )i=1,...,4n are dual orthonormal bases.
Moreover, we see that the distribution of D1 is equivalent to that of bases generated by
using random special type matrix Y
U← P(4, n, Fq). For the permutation π given in Eq. (13)
and the associated matrix, the left multiplication by gives the permutation π of the basis
vectors { p1,i }i=1,...,4n and the right multiplication by −1 gives the permutation π of the
coordinates of vectors in G4n . Therefore, by the conjugate action of the matrix , we obtain
a basis D1 : =(d1,ι)ι=1....,4n , whose distribution is equivalent to that of bases generated by
using random special type matrix X
U← L(4, n, Fq) = −1 · P(4, n, Fq) · , and its dual
D
∗
1 : =(d∗1,ι)ι=1....,4n .
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D can compute D0, D1, D̂∗0 : =(d∗0,1, d∗0,3, . . . , d∗0,5), D̂∗1 : =(d∗1,1, . . . , d∗1,n, d∗1,2n+1,
. . . , d∗1,4n) from B̂ : =(b1, b3), B∗, κG, and ξG.D then gives (paramn, {Dt , D̂∗t }t=0,1, gβ,0,
{gβ,1,i }i=1,...,n) to C, and outputs β ′ ∈ {0, 1} if C outputs β ′. gβ,0 is expressed over basis D0
as
g0,0 = W0( y∗0, 0, 0) + ηd0,5 = (δ, 0, 0, 0, σ0)D0 ,
g1,0 = W0( y∗1, 0, 0) + ηd0,5 = (δ, ρ, 0, 0, σ0)D0 ,
with σ0 : =σ + η, and gβ,1,i (i = 1, . . . , n) are expressed over bases P1 and D1 as













σ ei )D1 ,













σ ei )D1 ,
where δ, ρ, σ , and σ0 are distributed uniformly in Fq . Therefore, the distribution of (paramn,









R← GBP1β (1λ, n)
}
. unionsq
Lemma 18 For any machine B, there is a probabilistic machine C, whose running time
is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvP1B (λ) =
AdvBP1C (λ).
Proof Given a Basic Problem 1 instance
(paramn, {Bt , B̂∗t }t=0,1, f β,0, { f β,1,i }i=1,...,n),
C generates u, u′n


































(d1,n+1, . . . , d1,2n)T : =Z · (b1,n+1, . . . , b1,2n)T and (d∗1,n+1, . . . , d∗1,2n)T : =U ·
(b∗1,n+1, . . . , b∗1,2n)T. We set
D1 : = (b1,1, . . . , b1,n, d1,n+1, . . . , d1,2n, b1,2n+1, . . . , b1,4n),
D
∗
1 : = (b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,n, d∗1,n+1, . . . , d∗1,2n, b∗1,2n+1, . . . , b∗1,4n).
We then easily verify that D1 and D∗1 are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same
as the original bases, B1 and B∗1. We note that C cannot calculate above d∗1,i for i = n +
1, . . . , 2n (from B̂∗1) and D∗1 is consistent with B̂∗1. C gives (paramn, B0, B̂∗0, D1, B̂∗1, f β,0,{ f β,1,i }i=1,...,n) to B, and outputs β ′ ∈ {0, 1} if B outputs β ′.
Then, with respect to D1, D∗1 (instead of B1, B∗1), the above answer to B has the same
distribution as the Problem 1 instance, i.e., the above instance has the same distribution as
the one given by generator GP1β (1λ, n). unionsq
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Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5 For any machine B, there exists a probabilistic machine E , whose running time
is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvP2B (λ) ≤
AdvDLINE (λ) + 5/q.
Proof Similarly toLemma4,we employ the fact thatL(4, n, Fq ) is a subgroup ofGL(4n, Fq)
(Lemma 2) in the proof. For the proof of Lemma 5, we give an intermediate problem, Basic
Problem 2 below (Definition 12). From Lemmas 16, 19 and 20, we obtain Lemma 5. unionsq





β,0, e0, B̂1, B
∗
1, {h∗β,1,i , e1,i }i=1,...,n) and also we give the output of Basic
Problem 2 as such a vector form over bases {Bt , B∗t }t=0,1.
Definition 12 (Basic Problem 2) Basic Problem 2 is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given (paramn,
{B̂t , B∗t }t=0,1, y∗β,0, f 0, { y∗β,1,i , f 1,i }i=1,...,n)
R← GBP2β (1λ, n), where
GBP2β (1λ, n) : (paramn, {Bt , B∗t }t=0,1) R← GNIPE,CTob (1λ, 4, n),
B̂0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, . . . , b0,5), B̂1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n, b1,2n+1, . . . , b1,4n),
δ, δ0, ω
U← Fq , ρ, τ U← F×q ,
y∗0,0 : =(δ, 0, 0, δ0, 0)B∗0 , y∗1,0 : =(δ, ρ, 0, δ0, 0)B∗0 , f 0 : =(ω, τ, 0, 0, 0)B0 ,
for i = 1, . . . , n;









y∗0,1,i : = ( δei , 0n, δ0ei , 0n )B∗1
y∗1,1,i : = ( δei , ρei , δ0ei , 0n )B∗1
f 1,i : = ( ωei , τ ei , 0n, 0n )B1 ,
return (paramn, {B̂t , B∗t }t=0,1, y∗β,0, f 0, { y∗β,1,i , f 1,i }i=1,...,n).
forβ
U← {0, 1}. For a probabilisticmachine C, we define the advantage of C for Basic Problem
2, AdvBP2C (λ), as in Definition 8.
Lemma 19 For any machine C, there is a probabilistic machine D, whose running time is
essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvBP2C (λ) ≤
AdvBP0D (λ).
Proof D is given a Basic Problem 0 instance
(paramBP0, B̂, B
∗, y∗β, f , κG, ξG).
By using paramG : =(q, G, GT ,G, e) underlying paramBP0, D calculates
param0 : = (q, V0, GT , A0, e) : =Gdpvs(1λ, 5,paramG),
param1 : = (q, V1, GT , At , e) : =Gdpvs(1λ, 4n,paramG),
paramn : = ({paramt }t=0,1, gT ),
where gT is contained in paramBP0.
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D generates random linear transformations defined by matrices W0 U← GL(5, Fq) on V0
and W1
U← P(4, n, Fq) on V1 as in Remark 16, where P(4, n, Fq) is given in Eq. (14). Then
D sets
d0,ι : =W0(bι, 0, 0) for ι = 1, 2, d0,3 : =W0(0, 0, 0, κG, 0),
d0,4 : =W0(b3, 0, 0), d0,5 : =W0(0, 0, 0, 0, κG),
d∗0,ι : =(W−10 )T(b∗ι , 0, 0) for ι = 1, 2, d∗0,3 : =(W−10 )T(0, 0, 0, ξG, 0),
d∗0,4 : =(W−10 )T(b∗3, 0, 0) d∗0,5 : =(W−10 )T(0, 0, 0, 0, ξG),
q∗β,0 : =(W−10 )T( y∗β, 0, 0), g0 : =W0( f , 0, 0),
for i = 1, . . . , n,
p1,4(i−1)+ι : =W1(04(i−1), bι, 0, 04(n−i)) for ι = 1, 2, 3,
p1,4i : =Wt (04(i−1), 03, κG, 04(n−i)),
p∗1,4(i−1)+ι : =(W−11 )T(04(i−1), b∗ι , 0, 04(n−i)) for ι = 1, 2, 3,
p∗1,4i : =(W−11 )T(04(i−1), 03, ξG, 04(n−i)),
q∗β,1,i : =(W−11 )T(04(i−1), y∗β, 0, 04(n−i)) +
∑n
j=1 ηi, j p∗1,4( j−1)+3
where ηi : =(ηi,1, . . . , ηi,n) U← Fnq ,
g1,i : =W1(04(i−1), f , 0, 04(n−i))
where (04(i−1), v, 0, 04(n−i)) : =(04(i−1), G˜1, G˜2, G˜3, 0, 04(n−i)) for anyv : =(G˜1, G˜2, G˜3)
∈ V = G3. Then, D0 : =(d0,i )i=1,...,5 and D∗0 : =(d∗0,i )i=1,...,5, P1 : =( p1,i )i=1,...,4n and
P
∗
1 : =( p∗1,i )i=1,...,4n are dual orthonormal bases.
Moreover, we see that the distribution of P1 is equivalent to that of bases generated by
using random special type matrix Y
U← P(4, n, Fq). For the permutation π given in Eq. (13)
and the associated matrix, the left multiplication by gives the permutation π of the basis
vectors { p1,i }i=1,...,4n and the right multiplication by −1 gives the permutation π of the
coordinates of vectors in G4n . Therefore, by the conjugate action of the matrix , we obtain
a basis D1 : =(d1,ι)ι=1....,4n , whose distribution is equivalent to that of bases generated by
using random special type matrix X
U← L(4, n, Fq) = −1 · P(4, n, Fq) · , and its dual
D
∗
1 : =(d∗1,ι)ι=1....,4n .





1 from B̂ : =(b1, b3), B∗, κG, and ξG. D then gives (paramn, {D̂t , D∗t }t=0,1, q∗β,0,
g0, {q∗β,1,i , g1,i }i=1,...,n) to C, and outputs β ′ ∈ {0, 1} if C outputs β ′.
q∗β,0, g0 are expressed over bases (D0, D∗0) as
q∗0,0=(W−10 )T( y∗0, 0, 0)=(δ, 0, 0, σ, 0)D∗0 , q∗1,0=(W−10 )T( y∗1, 0, 0) = (δ, ρ, 0, σ, 0)D∗0 ,
g0 = W0( f , 0, 0) = (ω, τ, 0, 0, 0)D0 ,
and q∗β,1,i , g1,i (i = 1, . . . , n) are expressed over bases (P1, P∗1) and (D1, D∗1) as
q∗0,1,i = (W−11 )T(04(i−1), y∗0, 0, 04(n−i)) +
∑n
j=1 ηi, j p∗1,4( j−1)+3
= (04(i−1), δ, 0, σ, 0, 04(n−i))P∗1 +
∑n













q∗1,1,i = (W−11 )T(04(i−1), y∗1, 0, 04(n−i)) +
∑n
j=1 ηi, j p∗1,4( j−1)+3
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= (04(i−1), δ, ρ, σ, 0, 04(n−i))P∗1 +
∑n



























where ϕi : =σ ei + ηi , and δ, ρ, σ, ω, τ ∈ Fq , and ϕi ∈ Fnq are uniformly and indepen-
dently distributed. Therefore, the distribution of (paramn, {D̂t , D∗t }t=0,1, q∗β,0, g0, {q∗β,1,i ,









R← GBP2β (1λ, n)
}
. unionsq
Lemma 20 For any machine B, there is a probabilistic machine C, whose running time
is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, AdvP2B (λ) =
AdvBP2C (λ).
Proof Given a Basic Problem 2 instance
(paramn, {B̂t , B∗t }t=0,1, y∗β,0, f 0, { y∗β,1,i , f 1,i }i=1,...,n),
C generates u, u′n


































(d1,n+1, . . . , d1,2n)T : =Z · (b1,n+1, . . . , b1,2n)T and (d∗1,n+1, . . . , d∗1,2n)T : =U ·
(b∗1,n+1, . . . , b∗1,2n)T. We set
D1 : = (b1,1, . . . , b1,n, d1,n+1, . . . , d1,2n, b1,2n+1, . . . , b1,4n),
D
∗
1 : = (b∗1,1, . . . , b∗1,n, d∗1,n+1, . . . , d∗1,2n, b∗1,2n+1, . . . , b∗1,4n).
We then easily verify that D1 and D∗1 are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same
as the original bases, B1 and B∗1. We note that C cannot calculate above d1,i for i = n +
1, . . . , 2n (from B̂1) andD1 is consistentwith B̂1. C gives (paramn, B̂0, B∗0, B̂1, D∗1, y∗β,0, f 0,
{ y∗β,1,i , f 1,i }i=1,...,n) to B, and outputs β ′ ∈ {0, 1} if B outputs β ′.
Then, with respect to D1, D∗1 (instead of B1, B∗1), the above answer to B has the same
distribution as the Problem 2 instance, i.e., the above instance has the same distribution as
the one given by generator GP2β (1λ, n). unionsq
Next is a key lemma for applying the proof techniques in [25] to our NIPE (and
ZIPE) schemes, where limited randomness is used in public parameter, e.g., {Bi, j ,
B ′i, j,l}i=1,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n , in the NIPE scheme in Sect. 6.
Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6 Let en : =(0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ F nq . For all x ∈ F nq \ span〈en〉 and π ∈ Fq , let
Wx,π : ={(r , w)∈(span〈x, en〉\span〈en〉) × (F nq \ span〈en〉⊥) | r · w=π}.
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, for all (r , w) ∈ Wx,(x ·v),
Pr

































: =(U−1)T : =Z , and u′ : =(u′1, . . . , u′n). For x : =(x1, . . . , xn) and v : =(v1, . . . , vn)with
vn = 0, let
r : = xU = (ux1, . . . , uxn−1, x · u′) = (ux1, . . . , uxn−1, p), and





u′n(v1v−1n ) − u′1
)
, . . . , u−1
(




= (u′n)−1vn · (˜u1, . . . , u˜n−1, 1),
where u˜ j : = u−1
(
u′n(v jv−1n ) − u′j
)
for j = 1, . . . , n − 1 and p : =x · u′. Then,




j=1(ux j )˜u j + p
)
= r · w. (15)
Case that x · v = 0 Since x · v = 0, u and u′ can be generated as: (u, u˜1, . . . , u˜n−1, p) U←
{(u, (˜u j ) j=1,...,n−1, p) ∈ F×q × Fnq |
∑n−1
j=1(ux j )˜u j + p = 0}, u′n : =vn(
∑n−1
j=1(ux j )˜u j +
p)/(x · v), and u′j : =u′n(v jv−1n ) − uu˜ j for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. We note that the condition∑n−1
j=1(ux j )˜u j + p = 0 among u, u˜ j ( j = 1, . . . , n− 1) and p is equivalent to the condition
u′n = 0.
Since (u, u˜1, . . . , u˜n−1, p)
U← {(u, (˜u j ) j=1,...,n−1, p) ∈ F×q ×Fnq |
∑n−1
j=1(ux j )˜u j + p =
0} and u′n : =vn(
∑n−1
j=1(ux j )˜u j + p)/(x · v), the pair of r : =(ux1, . . . , uxn−1, p) and
w : = (u′n
)−1
vn · (˜u1, . . . , u˜n−1, 1) is uniformly distributed in Wx,(x ·v).
Case that x · v = 0 Since x · v = 0, Eq. (15) is given as ∑n−1j=1(ux j )˜u j + p = 0. Since x /∈
span〈en〉, there exists an index j0 ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} such that x j0 = 0.Using the index j0,u and
u′ can be generated as: u U← F×q , u˜ j U← Fq ( j = 1, . . . , j0 − 1, j0 + 1, . . . , n− 1), p U← Fq ,
u′j0 : =(−
∑
j=1,..., j0−1, j0+1,n−1 x j u
′
j −u−1 p)/x j0 , u′n
U← F×q and u′j : =u′n(v jv−1n )−uu˜ j
for j = 1, . . . , n − 1.
Since (u, u˜1, . . . , u˜n−1, p)
U← {(u, (˜u j ) j=1,...,n−1, p) ∈ F×q × Fnq |
∑n−1
j=1(ux j )˜u j +





(˜u1, . . . , u˜n−1, 1) is uniformly distributed in Wx,0. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7 For any machine A, there exists a probabilistic machine B1, whose running time
is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv(0)A (λ) −
Adv(1)A (λ)| ≤ AdvP1B1 (λ).
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Proof Lemma 7 is proven by the same manner as the proof of Lemma 4 in [25].
In order to prove Lemma 7, we construct a probabilistic machine B1 against Problem 1
using an adversary A in a security game (Game 0 or 1) as a black box as follows:
1. B1 is given a Problem 1 instance, (paramn, B0, B̂∗0, eβ,0, {Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i, j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n,
B̂
∗
1, {Eβ, j , E ′β, j,l} j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n), which is identified with (paramn, B0, B̂∗0, eβ,0,
B1, B̂
∗
1, {eβ,1,l}l=1,...,n) (Remark 4).
2. B1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A.
3. At the first step of the game, B1 provides A a public key pk : =(1λ,paramn, {B̂t }t=0,1)
of Game 0 (and 1), where B̂0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, b0,5) and B̂1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n, b1,3n+1,
. . . , b1,4n), which are obtained from the Problem 1 instance.
4. When a key query is issued for vector v, B1 answers normal key (k∗0, k∗1) with Eq. (7),
which is computed using {B̂∗t }t=0,1 of the Problem 1 instance.
5. When B1 receives an encryption query with challenge plaintexts (m(0),m(1)) and vec-
tor x : =(x1, . . . , xn) from A, B1 computes the challenge ciphertext (x, c0, {C1, j ,
C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3) which is identified with (x, c0, c1, c3) in Remark 3 such that c0 :
=− eβ,0 + ζ b0,3, c1 : =∑nl=1 xleβ,1,l , c3 : =gζTm(b), where b
U← {0, 1}, ζ U← Fq , and
(eβ,0, b0,3, {eβ,1,l}l=1,...,n) is a part of the Problem 1 instance.
6. When a key query is issued by A after the encryption query, B1 executes the same
procedure as that of step 4.
7. A finally outputs bit b′. If b = b′, B1 outputs β ′ : =1. Otherwise, B1 outputs β ′ : =0.
Claim 2 The distribution of the view of adversaryA in the above-mentioned game simulated
by B1 given a Problem 1 instance with β ∈ {0, 1} is the same as that in Game 0 (resp. Game
1) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1).
Proof Since the public keypk and secret keys skv answered byA are distributed as inGame 0
and 1, we consider the distribution of challenge ciphertext ctx : =(x, c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4,
c3) which is equivalent to (x, c0, c1, c3) under the identification Eq. (6).
When β = 0, ciphertext ctx generated in step 5 is
c0 = −e0,0 + ζ b0,3 = (−ω, 0, ζ, 0, −η0)B0 , c3 : =gζTm(b),
c1 = ∑nl=1 xle0,1,l = (ωx, 0n, 0n, η1 x)B1 ,
where variables ω, ζ, η0, η1 ∈ Fq are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore,
generated ctx and skv have the same distribution as in Game 0.
When β = 1, ciphertext ctx generated in step 5 is
c0 = −e1,0 + ζ b0,3 = (−ω, −τ, ζ, 0, −η0)B0 , c3 : =gζTm(b),
c1 = ∑nl=1 xl e1,1,l = (ωx, τ x, 0n, η1 x)B1 ,
where variables ω, τ, ζ, η0, η1 ∈ Fq are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore,
generated ctx and skv have the same distribution as in Game 1. unionsq
This completes the proof of Lemma 7. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 8
Lemma8 ForanymachineA, there exists a probabilisticmachineB2-1,whose running time is
essentially the same as that ofA, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-(h−1)-3)A (λ)−
Adv(2-h-1)A (λ)| ≤ AdvP2B2-h-1(λ), where B2-h-1(·) : =B2-1(h, ·).
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Proof Lemma 8 is proven by the same manner as the proof of Lemma 5 in [25].
In order to prove Lemma 8, we construct a probabilistic machine B2-1 against Problem
2 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 2-(h − 1)-3 or 2-h-1) as a black box as
follows:
1. B2-1 is given an integer h and a Problem 2 instance, (paramn, B̂0, B∗0, h∗β,0, e0,{Bi, j , B ′i, j,l}i=1,3,4; j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n, B∗1, {h∗β,1,l , E j , E ′j,l} j=1,...,4;l=1,...,n), which is iden-




β,0, e0, B̂1, B
∗
1, {h∗β,1,l , e1,l}l=1,...,n) (Remark 5).
2. B2-1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A.
3. At the first step of the game,B2-1 providesA a public key pk : =(1λ,paramn, {B̂′t }t=0,1)
ofGame2-(h−1)-3 (and2-h-1),where B̂′0 : =(b0,1, b0,3, b0,5) and B̂′1 : =(b1,1, . . . , b1,n,
b1,3n+1, . . . , b1,4n).
4. When the ι-th key query is issued for v : =(v1, . . . , vn), B2-1 answers as follows:
(a) When 1 ≤ ι ≤ h − 1, B2-1 answers semi-functional keys of the form Eq. (12), which
is computed using (B∗0, B∗1) of the Problem 2 instance.
(b) When ι = h, B2-1 calculates (k∗0, k∗1) using (h∗β,0, {h∗β,1,l}l=1,...,n) of the Prob-
lem 2 instance as follows: k∗0 : =h∗β,0 + b∗0,3, k∗1 : =
∑n
l=1 vlh∗β,1,l , where
(h∗β,0, b∗0,3, {h∗β,1,l}l=1,...,n) is a part of the Problem 2 instance.
(c) When ι ≥ h + 1, B2-1 answers normal keys of the form Eq. (7), which is computed
using (B∗0, B∗1) of the Problem 2 instance.
5. When B2-1 receives an encryption query with challenge plaintexts (m(0),m(1)) and vec-
tor x : =(x1, . . . , xn) from A, B1 computes the challenge ciphertext (x, c0, {C1, j ,
C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3) which is identified with (x, c0, c1, c3) in Remark 3 such that c0 :
= − e0 + ζ b0,3 + η0b0,5, c1 : =∑nl=1 xl(e1,l + η1b1,3n+l), c3 : =gζTm(b), where
b
U← {0, 1}, ζ, η0, η1 U← Fq , and (e0, b0,3, b0,5, {e1,l , b1,3n+l}l=1,...,n) is a part of the
Problem 2 instance.
6. When a key query is issued by A after the encryption query, B2-1 executes the same
procedure as that of step 4.
7. A finally outputs bit b′. If b = b′, B2-1 outputs β ′ : =1. Otherwise, B2-1 outputs β ′ : =0.
Claim 3 The distribution of the view of adversaryA in the above-mentioned game simulated
by B2-1 given a Problem 2 instance with β ∈ {0, 1} is the same as that in Game 2-(h − 1)-3
(resp. Game 2-h-1) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1).
Proof We consider the joint distribution of ctx and skv . We see that the distribution of
challenge ciphertext ctx : =(x, c0, {C1, j ,C2, j } j=1,...,4, c3) is the same as that in Game
2-(h − 1)-3 (and Game 2-h-1) similarly to the proof of Claim 2 for the case with β = 1.
When β = 0, the h-th secret key skv : =(v, k∗0, k∗1) generated in case (b) of step 4 or 6 is
k∗0 = h∗0,0 + b∗0,3 = (δ, 0, 1, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , k∗1 =
∑n
l=1 vlh∗0,1,l = ( δv, 0n, ϕ′1, 0n )B∗1 , where,
variables δ, ϕ0 ∈ Fq , ϕ′1 : =
∑n
l=1 vl ϕl ∈ F nq are uniformly and independently distributed.
Therefore, generated ctx and skv have the same joint distribution as in Game 2-(h − 1)-3.
When β = 1, the h-th secret key skv : =(v, k∗0, k∗1) generated in case (b) of step 4 or 6 is
k∗0 = h∗1,0+b∗0,3 = (δ, ρ, 1, ϕ0, 0)B∗0 , k∗1 =
∑n
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forU
U← H(n, Fq)∩GL(n, Fq) used for challenge ciphertext ctx , variables δ, ϕ0 ∈ Fq , ϕ′1 :=∑nl=1 vl ϕl ∈ F nq are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore, generated ctx
and skv have the same joint distribution as in Game 2-h-1. unionsq
This completes the proof of Lemma 8. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 9
Lemma9 ForanymachineA, for any security parameterλ, |Adv(2-h-1)A (λ)−Adv(2-h-2)A (λ)| ≤
1/q.
Proof We consider joint distribution of the h-th answered key (v, k∗0, k∗1) and the challenge
ciphertext (x, c0, c1) in Game 2-h-1.
k∗0 : =( δ, ρ, 1, ϕ0, 0 )B∗0 , k∗1 : =( δv, ρvZ , ϕ1, 0n )B∗1 ,
c0 : =( −ω, −τ, ζ, 0, η0 )B0 , c1 : =( ωx, τ xU, 0 n, η1 x )B1 ,
where δ, ρ, ϕ0, ω, τ, ζ, η0, η1
U← Fq , ϕ1 U← F nq , U U← H(n, Fq) ∩ GL(n, Fq) and Z :
=(U−1)T.
By the security definition, it holds that x · v = 0. From Lemma 6, (τ xU, ρvZ) is uni-
formly distributed in Wτ x,0. In particular, if τ = 0, it is uniformly distributed in Wx,0. That
is, coefficient −τ in k∗0 is independent from all the other variables except with negligible
probability 1/q , and the joint distribution is equivalent to that in Game 2-h-2 except with
negligible probability 1/q . unionsq
Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 10 For anymachineA, there exists a probabilisticmachineB2-2,whose running time
is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-h-2)A (λ)−
Adv(2-h-3)A (λ)| ≤ AdvP2B2-h-2(λ), where B2-h-2(·) : =B2-2(h, ·).
Proof Lemma 10 is proven by the similar manner to the proof of Lemma 8. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 11
Lemma 11 For any machineA, for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-ν-3)A (λ)−Adv(3)A (λ)| ≤
1/q.
Proof Lemma 11 is proven by the same manner as the proof of Lemma 7 in [25]. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 12
Lemma 12 For any machine A, for any security parameter λ, Adv(3)A (λ) = 0.
Proof The value of b is independent from the adversary’s view in Game 3. Hence,
Adv(3)A (λ) = 0. unionsq
123
768 T. Okamoto, K. Takashima
Proof of Lemma 13 in Sect. 8
Lemma 13 For any machine A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-ν)A (λ)−Adv(3)A (λ)| ≤
1/q.
Proof To prove Lemma 13, we will show distribution (paramV, B̂, {k( j)∗} j=1,...,ν , c, c3) in
Game 2-ν and that in Game 3 are equivalent (see Remark 9). For that purpose, we define
new bases D of V and D∗ of V∗ as follows:
We generate random θ
U← Fq , and set
d2n : = b2n − θb0, d∗0: = b∗0 + θb∗2n,
D : = (b0, . . . , b2n−1, d2n, b2n+1, . . . , b4n), D∗ : = (d∗0, b∗1, . . . , b∗4n).
We then easily verify that D and D∗ are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as the
original bases, B and B∗.
Keys and challenge ciphertext ({k( j)∗} j=1,...,ν , c, c3) in Game 2-ν are expressed over
bases (B, B∗) and (D, D∗) as
k( j)∗ = ( 1, δ( j)v( j), w( j), ϕ( j)v( j), 0n )B∗ = ( 1, δ( j)v( j), γ ( j), ϕ( j)v( j), 0n )D∗
c = ( ζ, ωx, r , 0n, η )B = ( ζ ′, ωx, r , 0n, η )B
c3 : = gζTm(b).
where
r : =p0 x + p1en with p0, p1 U← Fq , γ ( j) : = w( j) − θ en, ζ ′ : =ζ + p1θ.
γ ( j) and ζ ′ are uniformly, independently distributed since w( j) U← Fnq and θ U← Fq , except
for the case p1 = 0, i.e., except with the probability 1/q .
In the light of the adversary’s view, both (B, B∗) and (D, D∗) are consistent with public key
pk : =(1λ,paramV, B̂). Therefore, {k( j)∗} j=1,...,ν and c above can be expressed as keys and
ciphertext in two ways, in Game 2-ν over bases (B, B∗) and in Game 3 over bases (D, D∗).
Thus, Game 2-ν can be conceptually changed to Game 3. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 14 in Sect. 9
Lemma 14 For any machine A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv(2-ν)A (λ)−Adv(3)A (λ)| ≤
1/q.
Proof To prove Lemma 14, we will show distribution (paramV, B̂, {k( j)∗} j=1,...,ν , c, c3) in
Game 2-ν and that in Game 3 are equivalent.
For that purpose, we define new bases D of V and D∗ of V∗ as follows:
















U← H(n, Fq), θ U← Fq , and set
dn+i : = bn+i − ubi for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, d2n : = b2n − θb0 − ∑nι=1 u′ιbι
d∗0: = b∗0 + θb∗2n, d∗i : = b∗i + ub∗n+i + u′i b∗2n for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, d∗n : =b∗n + u′nb∗2n
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Short ciphertexts or short secret-keys for adaptively secure general IPE 769
Let
b1: = (b1, . . . , bn)T, b2 : =(bn+1, . . . , b2n)T, b∗1 : = (b∗1, . . . , b∗n)T, b
∗
2
: = (b∗n+1, . . . , b∗2n)T,









































D : =(b0, . . . , bn, dn+1, . . . , d2n, b2n+1, . . . , b4n), D∗ : =(d∗0, . . . , d∗n, b∗n+1, . . . , b∗4n).
We then easily verify that D and D∗ are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as the
original bases, B and B∗.
Keys and challenge ciphertext ({k( j)∗} j=1,...,ν , c, c3) in Game 2-ν are expressed over
bases B and B∗ as
k( j)∗ = ( 1, δ( j)v( j), w( j), ϕ( j)v( j), 0n )B∗ = ( 1, δ( j)v( j), γ ( j), ϕ( j)v( j), 0n )D∗ ,
c = ( ζ, ωx, r , 0n, η )B = ( ζ ′, x ′, r , 0n, η )D
c3: = gζTm(b),
where
γ ( j): = w( j) − (θ − uδ( j)v( j)n + δ( j) ∑nι=1 v( j)ι u′ι)en − uδ( j)v( j)
ζ ′: = ζ + θrn, x ′ : =ωx + rn u′ + ur .
γ ( j) ∈ span〈v( j), en〉, ζ ′ ∈ Fq , x ′ ∈ Fnq are uniformly, independently distributed since
w( j) U← span〈v( j), en〉, θ U← Fq , u′ : =(u′1, . . . , u′n)
U← Fnq except for the case rn = 0, i.e.,
except with the probability 1/q .
In the light of the adversary’s view, both (B, B∗) and (D, D∗) are consistent with public key
pk : =(1λ,paramV, B̂). Therefore, {k( j)∗} j=1,...,ν and c above can be expressed as keys and
ciphertext in two ways, in Game 2-ν over bases (B, B∗) and in Game 3 over bases (D, D∗).
Thus, Game 2-ν can be conceptually changed to Game 3. unionsq
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